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HONG KONG ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW AND CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITY REGULATIONS: PROMOTING E-COMMERCE IN THE
WORLD'S "MOST WIRED" CITY
Stephen E. Blythe'
Hong Kong is perhaps the "most wired" city in the world and
has one of the best environments for e-commerce. Hong Kong's e-
signature law is a major contributing factor to this environment.
The Electronic Transactions Ordinance Act of 2000 ("ETO")
allowed the utilization of only one form of electronic signature-
digital. This ran contrary to the trend in global electronic
signature law; which encourages nations to give legal recognition
to more than one. Accordingly, the ETO was amended in 2004 to
allow for: (1) multiple forms of electronic signatures to be used in
the private sector, with retention of the digital signature
requirement for official electronic communiques with the
government; (2) electronic delivery whenever the law specifies that
delivery is to be "by post or in person; " (3) bifurcation of the
Annual Report of Compliance Assessment pertaining to
certification authorities ("CA'), with one part to be performed by
an independent auditor, and the other part to be achieved with
submission of a sworn statement from the CA; and (4) a
requirement that major changes in the CA's organization must be
reported immediately to the government. Also in 2004, and
pursuant to the ETO, the government issued the Code of Practice,
a lengthy document meticulously specifying the standards and
procedures for carrying out the functions of a CA. The Code of
Practice includes detailed requirements for both the CA's Annual
Report of Compliance Assessment, as well as the requirements for
the contents of the CA 's Certification Practice Statement. Both of
these documents are required to be submitted to the government by
Ph.D. Candidate (Law), The University of Hong Kong; Ph.D. (Business
Administration), University of Arkansas, 1979; J.D. cum laude, Texas Southern
University, 1986; LL.M., University of Houston, 1992; LL.M. with distinction,
University of St".cjyde (Scotland), 2005. Attorney at Law & C.P.A., Texas.
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the CA and play an important role in oversight of their activities.
Therefore, while the amended ETO now recognizes the validity of
more than one form of electronic signature, it is strengthening the
degree of trustworthiness of digital signatures through more
stringent regulation of CAs. However, consumer protections
remain deficient, the author recommends that the ETO be
amended again to rectify this oversight.
I. MADE FOR EACH OTHER: E-COMMERCE AND THE WORLD'S
"MOST WIRED" CITY
Hong Kong may be the "most wired" city in the world.2 With a
state-of-the-art telecommunications infrastructure, Internet access
is available to every business and household in Hong Kong.3 More
than 90% of all households and business firms have broadband
(DSL) connectivity;4 in early 2004, Hong Kong had about 1.5
million DSL subscribers, more than 35% of the total Internet
subscriber base.' More than 100 Internet Service Providers do
business in Hong Kong, and ten of those are large and very-well-
financed organizations.6  In survey results released by the
International Telecommunications Union in 2003, Hong Kong
finished in first place in Internet access affordability, with average
Internet cost being only 0.19% of per-capita income.'
The government of Hong Kong aspires to make its city a global
e-commerce leader After the governor of Hong Kong declared
2 Mark Chun & Charla Griffy-Brown, Wired! Hong Kong, China and Japan
Flex Their Electronic Muscles, 7 GRAzIADiO Bus. REP. 1 (2004), http://gbr.
pepperdine.edu/041/itinfrastructures.html.
3 Lowtax.net, Hong Kong E-commerce Facilities: Hosting and ISP Facilities,
http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/hongkong/jhkefac.html#hosting.
4id.
5 id.
6id.
7 John Yat Chu Fung, .hk Hong Kong, in DIGITAL REVIEW OF ASIA PACIFIC
96 (Chin Saik Yoon ed., 2005/2006 ed.), available at http://www.digital-
review.org/05_HongKong.htm.
8 Lowtax.net, Hong Kong E-commerce: Development of Offshore
E-commerce Services in Hong Kong, http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/
hongkong/jhkecom.html.
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that Information Technology ("IT") was critical for business
success, the number of students enrolled in IT-related programs
doubled.9 The "Digital 21 Initiative" was launched in 1998, a
"package of initiatives through which Government, business,
industry and academia["] can work together to make Hong Kong a
'leading digital city in a globally connected world.""' Digital 21
includes the following projects: (1) the creation of the "Cyberport"
in 2002, the "Silicon Valley" of Hong Kong which contains office
and residential space for more than 100 high-tech business firms
and their employees; 2 (2) the government's adoption of the multi-
application "smart" identity card (using two thumbprints as the
biometric identifier) for all Hong Kong citizens and residents-
besides being used for "automated immigration clearance at border
control points,"'3 it can also store a digital certificate (with free
digital signature service available at the Hong Kong Post Office for
the first year of use) 4 and can be used as a public library card; 5
and (3) an emphasis on greater electronic delivery of public
services ("e-government")--by the end of 2003, most public
services amenable to electronic delivery had become available
online, 6 with the most popular options being "payment of
government bills, marriage appointment booking and submission
of trade-related documents."' 7
9 Chun & Griffy-Brown, supra note 2, at 8.
10 Development of Offshore E-commerce Services in Hong Kong, supra note
8. The government of Hong Kong's Information Technology & Broadcasting
Bureau ("ITBB") worked with its advisory group (consisting of representatives
from government, business, industry and academia), the Information
Infrastructure Advisory Committee, in developing the "Digital 21" programs.
" Development of Offshore E-commerce Services in Hong Kong, supra note
8.
12 Development of Offshore E-commerce Services in Hong Kong, supra note
8.
13 Fung, supra note 7.
14 Fung, supra note 7.
15 Fung, supra note 7.
16 Fung, supra note 7; Asia-Pacific Econ. Cooperation Tele. and Info.
Working Group, Update on Regulatory and Policy Developments-Hong Kong,
China, at 3-4, (Mar. 21-26, 2004).
17 Development of Offshore E-commerce Services in Hong Kong, supra note
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All of these thrusts are beginning to pay huge dividends. In
April 2005, a worldwide survey sponsored by the Economist
Intelligence Unit concluded that Hong Kong has the best e-
commerce environment in Asia. 8  In addition to its stellar
infrastructure, Hong Kong's e-signature law is also state-of-the-art,
providing a firm foundation for undertaking e-commerce
transactions with confidence and assurance.' 9
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE ARTICLE
The objectives of this article are to: (1) give the reader an
appreciation for the impressive success of Hong Kong's creation of
a high-tech infrastructure; (2) concisely describe the basic aspects
of public key infrastructure technology and digital signatures, and
explain its impact on e-commerce transactions; (3) describe Hong
Kong's original Electronic Transactions Ordinance, and explain its
recent amendments and their justification; (4) describe Hong
Kong's recently-adopted regulations pertaining to Certification
Authorities and their justification; and (5) make recommendations
for improvement of Hong Kong e-commerce law.
III. THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE
The Electronic Transactions Ordinance ("ETO") 2° was enacted
on January 5, 2000, and was fully implemented by April of that
year.2 It was influenced22 by the American Bar Association
18 Development of Offshore E-commerce Services in Hong Kong, supra note
8.
19 Hong Kong tax law has also helped. The Port of Hong Kong is virtually
duty-free, with tariffs placed on only a few categories of goods (e.g., alcoholic
beverages).
20 Electronic Transactions Ordinance ("ETO"), No. 1, (2000) O.H.K.
21 Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau ("ITBB"), Consultation
Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, at 1 (Mar.
2002).
22 Richard Wu, Electronic Transaction Ordinance-Building a Legal
Framework for E-commerce in Hong Kong, 1 J. INFO. L. & TECH. (2000),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/ilt/2000 1/wu/.
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Digital Signature Guidelines,23 the Utah Digital Signature Act, 24 the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce,25 the U.S.
Uniform Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 26 and the European
Union's Digital Signature Directive.
A. Legal Recognition of Digital Signatures
In 1995, Utah became the first jurisdiction in the United States
to enact a digital signature law.28 In that statute, Utah recognized
only digital signatures; it did not recognize other types of
electronic signatures.29 Although such a law provides for relatively
more security in e-commerce transactions, it carries the
disadvantage of being too restrictive. Nevertheless, Hong Kong
23 Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for Certification
Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce, 1996 A.B.A. INFO. SEC. COMM.,
available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/scitech/ds-ms.doc.
24 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (1999); see Thomas J. Smedinghoff & Ruth
Hill Bro, Moving With Change: Electronic Signature Legislation as a Vehicle
for Advancing E-commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 723, 726
(1999).
25 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ec-e.pdf.
6 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONs ACT ("UETA"), 7A U.L.A. 252 (2002).
UETA is a model law written by the United States National Conference on
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for consideration for enactment by the
respective state legislatures. Since its dissemination, UETA has been adopted in
almost all of the United States jurisdictions, either in its original form or with
amendments.
27 Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. For a concise
treatment of the United Nations, European Union, British and American law of
digital signatures, see Stephen E. Blythe, Digital Signature Law of the United
Nations, European Union, United Kingdom and United States: Promotion of
Growth in E-commerce With Enhanced Security, 11 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 6
(2005), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v I Ii2/article6.pdf.
28 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (1999).
29 An electronic signature may be defined as "any letters, characters, or
symbols manifested by electronic or similar means and executed or adopted by a
party with the intent to authenticate a writing." See infra note 86, at 511. There
are many forms of electronic signatures; examples include "a name typed at the
end of an e-mail message, a digitized fingerprint, a digitized image of a
handwritten signature that is attached to an electronic message, a retinal scan, a
pin number, or a digital signature." See infra, not 86, at 511.
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followed the Utah example in its original ETO recognizing only
the digital signature, and did not grant recognition to other forms
of electronic signatures.3" In granting recognition to the digital
signature, Hong Kong was effectively telling the world that it
would treat a digital signature the same as it treated a handwritten,
"hard copy" signature.
Under the ETO, "digital signature" was defined similarly to the
Utah Act, as follows:
An electronic signature of the signer generated by the transformation of
the electronic record using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash
function such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic
record and the signer's public key can determine: (a) whether the
transformation was generated using the private key that corresponds to
the signer's public key; and (b) whether the initial electronic record has
been altered since the transformation was generated.31
The original ETO was not "technologically-neutral." Instead,
it favored one technology-the digital signature-to the exclusion
of other forms of electronic signatures.32 The need for heightened
security seemed to be paramount in the mind's eye of the ETO's
creators. However, there are tradeoffs. The attainment of greater
security, achieved by only granting recognition to the digital
signature, meant that e-commerce participants' choices would be
limited. They would be forced to use a technology that offered
high security, but one that perhaps also would be more expensive,
less convenient, too complicated, and less adaptable to
technologies employed by other nations.33
30 ETO, supra note 20, §§ 2, 6.
3' ETO, supra note 20, §§ 2, 6.
32 It is debatable as to whether technological-neutrality is the correct road to
take. See Sarah E. Roland, Note, The Uniform Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act: Removing Barriers to E-commerce or Just
Replacing Them with Privacy and Security Issues?, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625,
638-45 (2001).
33 It is rude for a writer to divulge the ending in the middle of a story, but the
astute (if previously uninformed) reader may now correctly surmise that the
ETO was subsequently amended! The changes, resulting in a greater degree of
private-sector, technological-neutrality in Hong Kong electronic signature law,
will be covered below.
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B. Concomitant Effects of Sole Recognition, of the Digital
Signature
Sole recognition of the digital signature, to the exclusion of
other types of electronic signatures, has these concomitant effects:
(1) employment of an asymmetric cryptology; (2) utilization of
public key infrastructure ("PKI"); and (3) regulation of
Certification Authorities.34
1. Asymmetric Cryptology
Under the Utah Model, adopted in the original ETO, "digital
signatures receive legal protection only if asymmetric key
cryptology produced the digital signature. '35  Such a system
employs double keys--one key is used to encrypt the message by
the sender, and a different, albeit mathematically-related, 36 key is
used by the recipient to decrypt the message.37 The sender has a
private key, known only to him/her,38 used to generate the digital
signature, and the recipient uses the public key, often available
online, to verify that the proper party created the message and that
it has not been altered during transmission.39 This is a very good
system for e-commerce, since two stranger-parties, perhaps living
far apart, can confirm each other's identity and thereby reduce the
likelihood of fraud in the transaction.
34 Wu, supra note 22.
35 Renard Francois, Comment, Fair Warning, Preemption and Navigating the
Bermuda Triangle of E-Sign, UETA, and State Digital Signature Laws, 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 401, 40506 (2001).
36 PKI Assessment Guidelines, 2001 A.B.A INFO. SEC. COMM., available at
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/pagv30.pdf.
7 By contrast, "symmetric" cryptology employs one key. The same key is
used for both encryption and decryption. Thus, the sender and recipient are
using the same key. There are two disadvantages: (1) two stranger-parties using
a public network have no way to securely transmit symmetrical keys to be used
in subsequent transmissions; and (2) the transfer of a key in such a situation
could possibly be intercepted or modified by a third party. See Robin C.
Capehart & Mark A. Starcher, Wired, Wonderful West Virginia: Electronic
Signatures in the Mountain State, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 303, 311-12 (2002).
38 PKI Assessment Guidelines, supra note 36, at 305.39 Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 23, at 9.
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2. PK!
Before a party can digitally "sign" anything, he/she must first
be in possession of a pair of keys-the private key and a related
public key.4" The party will apply to a Certification Authority
("CA") to confirm his/her identity and to issue the pair of keys.
After the applicant's identity has been confirmed, the CA will
issue a certificate as verification of the subscriber's identity. The
certificate will be placed in a public repository, most often the
CA's website. Whenever the subscriber digitally signs a message,
the CA confirms the signature of the sender; whereupon, the CA
informs the recipient of the encrypted message which "public key"
is necessary to decode the message.4 At that point, the recipient is
able to access the public key which is used to decrypt the sender's
message. 2
The Utah model prescribes an open PKI system.43 In an open
system, unlike a closed one, the same certificate is used for all
parties with which the subscriber wants to transact. Accordingly, it
is relatively easier to enter into a transaction because it is easier to
digitally sign a document.' However, if the subscriber's private
key is lost or compromised, the consequences are potentially much
more egregious because there is a greater likelihood that the
40 Aristotle Mirzaian, Electronic Commerce: This is Not Your Father's
Oldsmobile, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 7, 13 (2002).
41 Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberspace Under E-Sign:
There's A New Sheriff in Town!, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 943, 992 (2002).
42 Jane Kaufman Winn, The Emperor's New Clothes: The Shocking Truth
About Digital Signatures andInternet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REv. 353 (2001).
43 Wu, supra note 22. In a closed PI system, the user-subscriber must obtain
a different certificate for different groups of people with whom they want to
conduct transactions. The advantage is that legal liability is potentially more
limited, since the CA and members of a certain group may enter into agreements
defining their rights and responsibilities toward each other; in an open PI
system, public law defines the rights and responsibilities of the parties. On the
other hand, the disadvantage of the closed PI system is that it is relatively
more difficult than the open system to digitally sign a document and to enter into
a transaction. Wu, supra note 22.
44 Wu, supra note 22 (citing D.J. Greenwood, Risk and Trust Management
Techniques For an "Open but Bounded" Public Key Infrastructure, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 277 (1998)).
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subscriber may be defrauded.4" Notwithstanding the adoption of an
open system, the ETO does contain some features which are
typical of a closed system, such as: (1) all Recognized CAs must
issue annual Certification Practice Statements; and (2) Recognized
CAs also have the option of specifying monetary liability limits in
the certificates they issue.46 Both of these considerations have the
effect of reducing the potential legal exposure of the Recognized
CA, and this is akin to a closed system. Therefore, it may be said
that the Hong Kong System is a "hybrid" one rather than being
purely open or purely closed.
3. Regulation of Certification Authorities
The ETO does not require a CA to apply for "recognition." An
"unrecognized" CA may legally operate in Hong Kong. However,
the ETO does not apply to an unrecognized CA. As a result, a
digital signature issued by an unrecognized CA has no legal
recognition, and accordingly, no legal rights and obligations will
attach to it that are enforceable in a court of law. Thus, although it
is a "voluntary" system,47 an unrecognized CA faces tremendous
pressure to become "recognized." In a de facto sense, the system
is not really voluntary; it is compulsory.
Furthermore, an unrecognized CA has unlimited liability,
whereas a Recognized CA ("RCA") is generally able to limit its
liability under the ETO.48 For example, an RCA will not be liable
for loss incurred due to reliance on a false or forged digital
45 Benjamin Wright has argued forcefully that PKI does not result in the
elimination or even the reduction of risk; it simply transfers it to the private key.
In a PKI system, it is critical for the private key holder to keep it secret and to
maintain security over it. Although a sophisticated party involved with "high-
end financial deals" may appreciate the advantages of the PKI system, the
unsophisticated person may be uncomfortable in being responsible for the all-
powerful private key. See Symposium, Cyber Rights, Protection, and Markets,
"Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic Signatures," 32 UWLA
L. REv. 215, 219-220 (2001).
46 Wu, supra note 22.
47 ETO, supra note 20, § 20(1) (stating "[a] certification authority may apply
to the Director to become a recognized certification authority for the purposes of
this Ordinance") (emphasis added).
48 ETO, supra note 20, § 42.
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signature supported by its certificate, provided the RCA has
complied with all material requirements of the ETO and the Code
of Practice.49 Additionally, the RCA may reduce its exposure by
placement of a "cap" on its legal liability, i.e., by stating a
"reliance limit."5 °  The RCA is afforded limitation of liability
because of two reasons: (1) it will speed up the issuance of
certificates, since the CA will not have to engage in so much
research of the applicant; and (2) it will make the purchase of the
digital signature cheaper to the applicant, since the RCA will have
less expenses due to diminished need for liability insurance
coverage. On the other hand, the ETO has been criticized for
shifting "an immense liability burden onto consumers who conduct
electronic transactions through the RCA."'"
But note-the above does not give the RCA carte blanche to
be negligent, reckless, or to intentionally deceive. The RCA will
be liable for damages incurred due to reliance on erroneous
information stated in a certificate or in a repository, if the RCA had
a duty to confirm the information according to the Code of Practice
or the Certification Practice Statement, but negligently, recklessly
or intentionally failed to do so. 52
The RCA is afforded relatively greater respect and status than
its unrecognized counterpart. Subscribers, other interested parties,
and the general public place relatively greater trust and reliance in
an RCA. This is because RCA status is only granted to those CAs
with: (1) a good financial position; (2) good liability insurance
coverage; (3) trustworthy systems; (4) good security arrangements;
(5) high standards required for issuance of certificates; (6) officers
who are "fit and proper persons;" and (7) notice of acceptance
reliance limits which are stated in the certificates.53
The RCA must be able to show that it uses a trustworthy
system of issuing and withdrawing certificates and displaying them
49 ETO, supra note 20, § 42(1).
50 ETO, supra note 20, § 42(2).
51 Wu, supra note 22. The author contends that the ETO in its current form is
deficient in its consumer protections. Id. See discussion infra
Recommendations Section.
52 ETO, supra note 20, § 42(3).
53 ETO, supra note 20, § 22.
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in a public repository. The Director of Information Technology
issued a Code of Practice for RCAs, which delineates the standards
and procedures to be used by RCAs for implementation of the
ETO 4 Furthermore, every RCA is required to submit a report to
the Director of Information Technology Services, a Certification
Practice Statement ("CPS"), stating the standards and procedures
employed in issuing certificates and in carrying out its other
tasks.55 The CPS, in turn, is used to determine the legal liability
limits of the RCA.
Interestingly, the ETO established the Hong Kong Post Office
as an RCA. 6 Several reasons may account for this. One is that it
is simply convenient to go to a local post office in one's
neighborhood to find an RCA. Another reason may be that the
lawmakers were unsure as to whether private firms57 would be
54 See infra note 157.
55 ETO, supra note 20, § 44; see infra note 307 (stating that an up-to-date
copy of the CPS must be kept on file with the government and in the RCA's
repository).
56 ETO, supra note 20, §§ 34, 35. This was criticized by the Chamber of
Commerce on the ground that it will give the public sector too much influence
upon electronic transactions, resulting in a "playing field which is possibly not
level" for private CAs. See infra note 96, at 4.
57 Digi-Sign Certification Services, Ltd., ("Digi-Sign") a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Tradelink Electronic Commerce, Ltd., became the first private CA
in Hong Kong. By 2004, it had more than 170,000 subscribers. Its website is
located at http://www.digi-sig.com. Later, HiTrust became the second private
CA in Hong Kong. It is affiliated with the Veri-Sign Trust Network, and its
website address is http://www.hitrust.com.hk. On May 18, 2004, Digi-Sign
announced it had entered into a cooperative agreement with Guangdong
Electronic Certification Authority ("GECA") to jointly issue a "Unified-Cert."
The Unified-Cert makes it possible for PRC residents (possessing valid travel
documents to Hong Kong, or a Hong Kong Identity Card) to simultaneously
obtain, in one application, both the Digi-Sign ID-Cert and the digital certificate
of GECA. This service is expected to lead to an increase of online activities
between Hong Kong and Guangdong Province. GECA was established by the
Guangdong provincial government in 2000 and now has more than 180,000
subscribers. Its website address is http://www.cnca.net. For a brief discussion
of the E-commerce regulations of Guangdong Province, see Andrew Zheng, "E-
commerce in China-Guangdong Promulgates Comprehensive Legislation,"
available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/page.cfmn?id=5 1; Digi-Sign and
Guangdong Electronic Certification Authority Cooperate on Unfied-Cert
Service, available at http://www.tradelink.com.hk/eng/ 20040518.html.
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interested in becoming a CA and they wanted to ensure that at least
one well-known CA was available to get the implementation of the
ETO underway.
The Director has a number of enforcement powers which may
be exercised against RCAs. Their recognition may be suspended
or revoked if they do not: (1) maintain a trustworthy system; or (2)
abide by the provisions of the ETO, the Code of Practice, or its
own CPS. 8
C. Obligation of Secrecy
In reaction to the public concern over security of private
information, the ETO included a provision mandating secrecy.
Persons attaining access to confidential data while performing
functions covered by the ETO (e.g., the RCA's attainment of the
subscriber's personal information in an application for a
certificate) are prohibited from disclosure to other persons. 9 The
ETO also forbids the knowing or reckless dissemination of false
information whilst engaged in a function under the statute (e.g.,
giving false information to an RCA in an application for a
certificate),6" or for persons pretending to be an RCA.6 Violators
may be subject to fine or imprisonment.6 2
D. ETO Not Applicable in Certain Specified Situations
The old-fashioned "hard copy" is still mandatory in the
creation of the following legal documents: wills, codicils and
58 ETO, supra note 20, §§ 23, 24.
59 Exceptions are allowed where it is necessary to carry out a function of the
ETO, pursuant to a court order, or for the purpose of implementation or
otherwise pertaining to a criminal proceeding in Hong Kong.
60 ETO, supra note 20, § 47.
61 ETO, supra note 20, § 48.
62 ETO, supra note 20, § 46. With identity theft and other cyber-crime on the
rise, the issue of privacy in E-commerce becomes ever-more compelling. For a
recent discussion of computer crime in Hong Kong, see Dr. Kam C. Wong,
Computer Crime and Control in Hong Kong, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 337
(2005). See generally Paul Toscano, Toward an Architecture of Privacy for the
Virtual World, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 151 (2000).
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other testamentary documents;63 anything to do with the creation,
change or revocation of an express trust;' a power of attorney;65
documents required to be stamped pursuant to the Stamp Duty
Ordinance (Cap. 117);66 government grants and leases;6 7 deeds,
conveyances, judgments, written instruments, fis pendens and
documents effecting a floating charge (referred to in sect. 2A)
pursuant to the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 128);68
assignments, mortgages and legal charges under the Conveyancing
and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219);69 oaths and affidavits;"0
statutory declarations;7' judgments or orders of a court;72 warrants
issued by a court or a magistrate;73 and negotiable instruments.74
Furthermore, in Hong Kong (as in most jurisdictions of the
world), forget about using email to file court documents. The ETO
is not applicable to matters coming before the following courts,
government agencies or government officials: the Court of Final
63 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(1). As evidence that electronic documenting
is on the march, even this common exception may be on its way out. See Chad
Michael Ross, Comment, Probate-Taylor v. Holt-The Tennessee Court of
Appeals Allows a Computer Generated Signature to Validate a Testamentary
Will, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 603 (2005). Tennessee became the first U.S. state to
recognize that a computer-generated signature may be used by a testator to
"sign" the document. The testator had affixed the electronic signature in the
presence of two witnesses. The appellate court found that "[a] computer-
generated signature made by a testator comes within the description of 'any
other symbol or methodology executed or adopted by a party with intention to
authenticate a writing or record,' and if affixed before two or more attesting
witnesses, satisfies the requirements for a testator to execute a will." Id. at 603.
64 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(2). However, this exclusion does not refer to
a resulting, implied or constructive trust.
65 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(3).
66 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(4). However, this exclusion does not refer to
a contract note relating to s 5A of the Stamp Duty Ordinance.
67 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(5).
68 ETO, supra note 20, scheds. 1(6), 1(8).
69 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(7).
70 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(9).
71 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(10).
72 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(11).
73 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(12).
74 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 1(13).
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Appeal;75 the Court of Appeal;76 the Court of First Instance; 77 the
District Court;78 the Mental Health Review Tribunal established
pursuant to the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap. 136);71 the Lands
Tribunal;8  a coroner appointed under § 3 of the Coroners
Ordinance (Cap. 504);8" the Labour Tribunal;82 the Obscene
Articles Tribunal established under the Control of Obscene and
Indecent Articles Ordinance (Cap. 390);83 the Small Claims
Tribunal;84 and magistrates.8 5
E. Deficiencies of the Original ETO
1. No Mention of Foreign CAs
E-commerce is an international phenomenon. 6 If a party in
Hong Kong engages in a commercial transaction with a party in a
foreign country, and the foreign party uses a certificate issued by a
foreign CA does the ETO recognize that certificate? That issue
was not dealt with in the original ETO.87
2. No Mention of Insolvency of CAs
What if the CA, after issuing the certificate, becomes insolvent
and declares bankruptcy? What is the impact of that situation on
the legal viability of the certificate generally, and upon the legal
75 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(a).
76 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(b).
77 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(c).
78 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(d).
79 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(e).
80 ETO supra note 20, sched. 2(f).81 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(g).
82 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(h).
83 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(i).
84 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(j).
85 ETO, supra note 20, sched. 2(k).
86 For insights into the complexity of conflict of laws rules in international E-
commerce, see Jochen Zaremba, International Electronic Transaction Contracts
Between U.S. and EU Companies and Customers, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 479
(2003).
87 Wu, supra note 22.
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liability of the CA specifically? This important issue is not
addressed in the ETO.88
3. No Mention of Legal Obligations of Subscribers
The ETO devotes a considerable amount of attention to the
duties and responsibilities of CAs. In particular, the statute goes to
great pains to ensure that the CA uses a "trustworthy" system.
However, the original ETO gave scant attention to the duties and
responsibilities of subscribers, and to their actions which could
undermine the trustworthiness of the system. Subscribers should
be held accountable and legally responsible for their actions which
reduce the security of the system, e.g.: (1) not maintaining
adequate security controls over the private key; (2) committing
errors in the creation of the message and the digital signature; and
(3) using unreliable hardware or software which could lead to
mechanical errors. If the CA has responsibilities, so does the
subscriber.89
4. Deficient Consumer Protections
Sometimes, the e-commerce buyer finds herself at the mercy of
the predator-seller. Especially, the buyer is in need of protections
requiring the seller to prominently display electronic notices
pertaining to the sale, and to ensure that the buyer will be able to
gain access to those notices.
5. The "Hamstrung" Effect
As mentioned, the original ETO followed the Utah Model and
adopted the digital signature as the only recognized technology.
This degree of devotion to one technology "locked in" the ETO to
the digital signature exclusively and made it less open-minded and
considerate of other, potentially better technologies. Technology
changes and evolves at a rapid pace indeed. Accordingly, the
original ETO had the drawback of becoming pass6 and out-of-date
overnight, just as soon as some new, better form of technology
88 Wu, supra note 22.
89 Wu, supra note 22.
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made its appearance.9" The original ETO was criticized for being
too inflexible, and this criticism (and others) led to a number of
amendments in the statute.9
IV. THE ITBB's CONSULTATION PAPER: RECOMMENDED
AMENDMENTS TO THE ETO
In the summer of 2001, the Hong Kong Government's
Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau ("ITBB")
undertook an internal governmental review of the ETO for the
purpose of ensuring that Hong Kong's e-commerce law remained
up-to-date.92 Toward that end, all Hong Kong governmental
departments were consulted and asked to state their views on
issues pertaining to the ETO. At the end of the of the
consultations, the viewpoints were compiled into a group of
preliminary proposals for amendment of the ETO.9 3 In March,
2002, the ITBB issued its findings to the public in the Consultation
Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance and
requested the public to comment on them. A consideration of the
specific proposals follows.
A. Proposals for Legal Recognition of Other Forms of Electronic
Signatures
First, the ITBB stated its view that all governmental
departments should review whether the digital signature
requirement can be removed, "in order to facilitate electronic
90 This criticism of the Utah Model is viable. However, there is another side
to the story. Until a better technology comes along, the digital signature is one
of the best-if not the best-for E-cornmerce transactions. See Stephen E.
Blythe, supra note 26, at 21 (contending that the United Kingdom and the
United States are "too 'minimalist' and need to achieve more stringency and
standardization in their e-signature laws").
91 The European Union and the United States agree that the proper course for
E-commerce law to take is a "minimalist" one. See Christopher William
Pappas, Comparative U.S. & E.U Approaches to E-commerce Regulation:
Jurisdiction, Electronic Contracts, Electronic Signatures and Taxation, 31
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 325 (2002).
92 ITBB, supra note 21, at 1.
93 ITBB, supra note 21, at 2-9.
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transactions."94  They proposed that other forms of electronic
signatures-besides digital signatures-should be considered for
legal recognition.95
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce was pleased
to see the ITBB's consideration of other forms of electronic
signatures. According to the Chamber of Commerce, this would
be consistent with UNCITRAL's Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, which advocated technological-neutrality and a
"minimalist" approach with as little regulation as possible.
However, the Chamber of Commerce also noted that their concerns
were not completely allayed by the government's proposals96
stating: "There should thus be no need to confer such sweeping
powers, including determination of even the form, manner, and
format of electronic record, to the Secretary for Information
Technology and Broadcasting .... This regulatory approach is too
restrictive."97
1. Proposal to Use the Pin As a Substitute for the Digital
Signature: Rejected
As previously mentioned, there are a number of electronic
signatures available; the digital signature is only one type of
electronic signature. Interestingly, the ITBB advocated that the
personal identification number ("PIN") be seriously considered for
adoption as an alternative to the digital signature requirement.
They observed that the PIN was already used extensively in
banking operations around the world and in the implementation of
E-government functions in many countries.98  "With proper
management, [the PIN] can . . . satisfy] the signature
requirement... where the level of security offered by it is
commensurate with the risk of the service involved, e.g. where
94 ITBB, supra note 21, at 2.
95 ITBB, supra note 21, at 2.
96 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
HONG KONG GENERAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, May, 2002, at 1. (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology).
9 7 Id. at 3.
98 ITBB, supra note 21, at 3.
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there is [an] already established relationship between the
parties .... , Their argument was that the PIN offered more
economy and convenience for the user, albeit with less security,
and that the individual user should decide the level of security
desired."'
In its response to the government's Consultation Paper on the
Review of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, the Chamber of
Commerce embraced the proposal to grant legal acceptance to
PINs as an alternate form of electronic signature.0 1 Naturally, they
took a "pro-market" approach to the issue: "We would
emphasi[z]e that the aim of electronic signature authentication is to
simplify, not complicate electronic commerce.""1 2 The Chamber of
Commerce cited UNCITRAL's stance that electronic signatures
should be presumed to be valid and enforceable, and should not
become hamstrung by any specific technical requirements.0 3 They
adopted the ITBB's economic argument as well: "[I]n a free
market different levels of security will be needed by different
businesses, at different costs."' 4
However, the wholesale acceptance of the PIN as a viable
substitute for the digital signature was not to be. This proposal did
not become an amendment to the ETO. The serious flaws in the
proposal were exposed in a journal article written by a group of
law professors at The University of Hong Kong ("HKU"). 5 As a
99 ITBB, supra note 21, at 3.
100 ITBB, supra note 21, at 3.
101 Consultation Paper on the Review
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong
supra note 96, at 2.
102 Consultation Paper on the Review
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong
supra note 96, at 3.
103 Consultation Paper on the Review
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong
supra note 96, at 3.
104 Consultation Paper on the Review
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong
supra note 96, at 3.105 K.H. Pun, Lucas Hui, K.P. Chow, W.W.
of the Electronic Transactions
General Chamber of Commerce,
of the Electronic Transactions
General Chamber of Commerce,
of the Electronic Transactions
General Chamber of Commerce,
of the Electronic Transactions
General Chamber of Commerce,
Tsang, C.F. Chong & H.W. Chan,
Review of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance: Can the Personal
Identification Number Replace the Digital Signature?, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 241
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foundation for discussion, the article noted that a signature must
satisfy three basic requirements: (1) it must identify the signatory
in order to show that the document carries his/her authority-the
"authorization" requirement; (2) it must indicate that the signatory
has approved the document's contents-the "approval"
requirement; and (3) there must be an absence of fraud in that the
signature must indeed be that of the signatory and has been applied
with her/her consent to the document-the "no fraud"
requirement. °6 To comply with the authorization requirement,
there must be a confirmation that the signature is that of the
signatory; to comply with the approval requirement, the signatory
must be able to ensure that the document's contents will not be
altered subsequent to the signing; and, to comply with the no fraud
requirement, the signature must be sophisticated enough to
reasonably ensure that it has not been forged.10 7
A digital signature complies with all three of these
requirements.0 8 If the hash value computed by the document's
recipient is identical to that of the hash value contained in the
digital signature, then it can be concluded that: (1) the document
has not been altered; (2) the document was created or authorized
by the owner of the private key, whose identity is confirmed by the
certification authority; and (3) there is virtually no chance of fraud
having occurred because it is impossible to mathematically
compute the private key using the public key. 09 Hence, all three
requirements are fulfilled by the digital signature.
(2002). But see Clement Shum & Sai-hong Ko, The Legal Significance of PINs
in Banking, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 194 (2000) (arguing (1) the common law
should regard a PIN as a form of electronic signature; (2) the PIN holder owes a
duty of care to his bank when using the PIN; (3) a bank should not hold the PIN
holder liable for consequential losses emanating from a criminal's use of
unconscionable or deceptive means to obtain the PIN; and (4) a bank has a duty
to warn its customers of criminal acts which may be used against PIN holders).
106 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 243-45 (describing consistency with
UNCITRAL's Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the European Union's
Directive on Electronic Signatures).
107 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 248.
108 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 251.
109 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 251-52.
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Does the PIN satisfy the three requirements? No, it satisfies
only the authorization requirement-it does not satisfy the
approval requirement and the no fraud requirement."' A person
with illegitimate knowledge of a PIN may use it to fabricate an
electronic document and create a session record contending that
the document was created by the rightful PIN owner."'
Furthermore, the culprit who has gained access to a PIN may
attach it to a fabricated electronic document at any time, and the
fabrication cannot be distinguished from an original document."2
In their article, the HKU. professors cast a spotlight on PIN
technology and drove home the point that, in comparison to digital
signature technology, it is relatively primitive and offers
significantly less security."' Their criticism, coupled with that of
others, resulted in the rejection of the ITBB's proposal to grant the
PIN full-fledged legal status as an acceptable form of electronic
signature.
2. Proposal to Postpone Utilization Of Biometrics: Rejected
The ITBB, although acknowledging that biometrics is
technologically sound, decided to call for a postponement of its
utilization. They contended there was "currently no institutional
arrangement in place which can support their application on a
community-wide basis.""' 4 Furthermore, they stated that they did
not foresee the emergence in the near future of an "independent
and trusted third party" who could collect biometric data from
subscribers on a community-wide basis, or that biometrics would
gain wide acceptance in the community."5 How wrong they were!
The best item of evidence indicating wide acceptance of biometrics
in Hong Kong is the Hong Kong Identity Card, accepted by the
'10 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 254.
1' Pun et al., supra note 105, at 254.
112 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 254.
113 Pun et al., supra note 105, at 254.
14 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 3.
"
5 id. at4.
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government as well as the general public, and employing two
thumb prints as its biometric identifier."6
To its credit, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
took a view contrary to that of the ITBB and had called for "some
means of enabling them [biometric identifiers] early within the
current legislative framework [to] be examined.""' 7 Their position
was that technological development should be market-driven," 8 not
government-driven; the role of government should be "to provide a
framework to enable the market to freely develop these, rather than
making a judgment as to which types of technology should mature
and when.""' 9 It remains to be seen whether biometrics will be
employed in private business to the extent that the Hong Kong
government has employed it, but the almost-universal tide of
acceptance created by the successful I.D. card seems to be
overwhelming. 2 0
3. Proposal to Allow for Electronic "Delivery by Post or in
Person:" Accepted
Noting that a number of Hong Kong laws allowed for legal
notice to be given through "Delivery by Post or in Person," the
ITBB proposed that electronic delivery should be deemed as
116 For a discussion of the Hong Kong Identity Card and its legal aspects, see
Rina C.Y. Chung, Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: Data Privacy Issues
and Implications for a Post-September 11th America, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y
J. 518 (2003).
117 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 2.
118 On the other hand, a number of good counter-arguments can be made
against allowing the marketplace to be the "primary legislator of electronic
signatures." See Jennifer L. Koger, Note, You Sign, E-SIGN, We All Fall Down:
Why the United States Should Not Crown the Marketplace as Primary
Legislator of Electronic Signatures, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
491 (2001).
119 Id. at3.
120 The highest level of security in electronic transactions is attained by using
a combination of biometric identifiers and the digital signature. Michael
Dessent, Browse-Wraps, Click- Wraps and Cyberlaw: Our Shrinking (Wrap)
World, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 1, 9 (2002).
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complying with this requirement. In order to avoid each and every
law having to be amended to allow for electronic notice, an
amendment to the ETO was proposed allowing that "delivery by
post or in person" would be automatically interpreted to so
allow. 2 ' The Chamber of Commerce had no objection, stating
"obviously we support extending [the ETO's] meaning to cover
delivery by electronic means."'2 This amendment was adopted,
but a proviso was added to the effect that the recipient must agree
to the delivery in electronic form.
4. Proposal to Continue Most Exemptions Under the ETO:
Accepted
The ITBB categorized the exemptions under the ETO into five
groups: (1) where the matter or document involved is solemn (e.g.,
electoral process); (2) where there is an operational need (e.g.,
requirement to produce a document to a Government authority
immediately, "on-the-spot"); (3) voluminous and complex
submission (e.g., works departments); (4) need for adherence to
international practices (e.g., documents to be retained by an
international flight crew); and (5) need to ensure that the
Government can meet its contractual obligations (e.g., submission
requirements pertaining to trade-related documents concerning the
franchise of the Tradelink).'23
The Chamber of Commerce, given its "minimalist" approach to
regulation, naturally supported "a more aggressive approach to
encourage wider application of electronic means." It opined that,
over time, the need for the exclusions would be reduced.124
121 ITBB, supra note 21, at 4.
122 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 2.
123 ITBB, supra note 21, at 56.
124 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 2.
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5. Proposed Changes in Regulation of Certification Authorities:
Accepted
The ETO provides for a voluntary recognition program for
CAs. 125 CAs are not obliged to apply for recognition. Those who
do must present, on an annual basis, evidence to the Director of
Information Technology that they provide a trustworthy service.2 6
The ETO requires CAs to hire an independent assessor (e.g., a
Certified Public Accountant) to prepare and submit an assessment
report to the Director. 127 In the Consultation Paper on the Review
of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, the ITBB recommended
that the assessment report be divided into two parts: one part
dealing with issues pertaining to the trustworthiness factors, and
the other part pertaining to the non-trustworthiness factors. 2 1
Furthermore, the ITBB proposed that the independent assessor
only be required to address the trustworthiness issues, with the
non-trustworthiness issues covered by a declaration made by an
authorized agent of the CA. 129
Additionally, the ITBB noted that sometimes, extraordinary
situations will require a CA to submit a report to the Director in the
middle of a reporting period, before the end of the year.130
Examples of such situations might be: (1) significant changes in
the financial status of the CA; (2) changes in the liability insurance
coverage of the CA; or (3) changes pertaining to "the system,
procedure, security arrangements and standards used by the CA to
issue certificates to its subscribers."' 3' In such situations, the
proposal would give the Director the authority to mandate the CA
to prepare a report in mid-year covering only these extraordinary
factors. '3 2
125 ITBB, supra note 21, at 6.
126 ITBB, supra note 21, at 6-7.
127 ITBB, supra note 21, at 7.
128 ITBB, supra note 21, at 8.
129 ITBB, supra note 21, at 8.
130 ITBB, supra note 21, at 8.
131 ITBB, supra note 21, at 8.
132 ITBB, supra note 21, at 9.
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The Chamber of Commerce agreed with these two proposals.'33
However, on the issue of regulation of CAs generally, the Chamber
of Commerce claimed that the Director of Information Technology
Services had a conflict of interest with the Postmaster General,
since the Postmaster is a designated CA under the ETO, and the
Director and the Postmaster are "two departments under the same
policy bureau." '134 Accordingly, the Chamber of Commerce called
for the Director to confer with an independent advisory committee,
consisting of representatives from other affected parties, in the
discharge of its regulatory duties over the Postmaster General.135
V. AMENDMENTS TO THE ETO: 2004
Following the dissemination of the ITBB's Consultation Paper
on the Review of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance in 2002,136
and the subsequent responses to it by the Chamber of Commerce'37
and other interested parties, a bill was prepared for consideration
by the Hong Kong Legislature.'38 As a result, the Electronic
Transactions (Amendment) Ordinance 39  (the "Amendment
Ordinance") was enacted and went into effect on 30 June 2004.140
133 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 4.
134 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 4.
135 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 4.
136 ITBB, supra note 21.
137 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96.
138 Legislative Council Brief, Electronic Transactions (Amendment) Bill
2003.
139 Electronic Transactions (Amendment) Ordinance ("Amendment
Ordinance"), No. 14 (2004) O.H.K., A477-A515.
140Id. at A481.
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A. Private Contracts: Electronic Form Allowed, With
Technological-Neutrality
One of the amendments grants private parties the right to select
the form of electronic signature they desire. No particular form of
electronic signature is required in the case of private contracts,
subject to certain exceptions pertaining to reliability,
appropriateness in specific circumstances, and of course the
preferences of the parties.141 This is commensurate with the
worldwide trend toward technological-neutrality and less
regulation of electronic signatures.
In private contracts, it is recognized that the private parties
themselves should decide the issue of which form of electronic
signature to use. One factor in this decision is the economics, i.e.,
the parties must decide whether to use a more sophisticated, yet
more expensive form (i.e., the digital signature) or to use a less
sophisticated, yet cheaper form.'4 2 In the private sector, it is
considered unwise to tie the parties to a specific form of electronic
signature. Instead, let market forces decide. 43  Furthermore,
technological innovation continues at a rapid pace, so better forms
of technology may exist tomorrow which are only on the "drawing
board" today.
However, the digital signature requirement continues in force
for electronic communiquds with the government.1" This is
considered "necessary and defensible"'45 because the focus on one
form of electronic signature provides clarity and certainty to
citizens, making filing requirements easier to comprehend. This
will also be "cost-effective"'46 to the Hong Kong government
141 Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, § 5 (amending ETO § 6).
142 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 3.
'43 Consultation Paper on the Review of the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance: Comments by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 96, at 3.
144Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, § 5 (amending ETO § 6).145 Legislative Council Brief, supra note 138, at 3.
146 Legislative Council Brief, supra note 138, at 3.
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because only one form of electronic signature will have to be dealt
with.
B. Electronic Delivery Allowed in Cases of Serving Documents
"by Post or in Person "
Many statutes in Hong Kong allow for service of documents
"by Post or in Person." These statutes were enacted before the
invention of the computer and before it was possible to send
electronic messages. The government and the citizens would be
well-served for these laws to allow for the legal recognition of
electronic service. For both the government and the relevant
parties, electronic service carries the important advantages of being
cheaper and more convenient. 147
Accordingly, the ETO was amended. It now states that
electronic service "to an information system designated by the
person" satisfies the requirement for "a document to be served on a
person by personal service or by post."'48
This amendment does not apply if an ordinance requires the
personal service upon one private party by another private party,
where neither is affiliated with the government. In that situation,
another amendment is applicable: electronic service will be
allowed to fulfill the service requirement only if the recipient gives
consent to the utilization of the electronic form.'49
C. Voluntary Recognition Program for Certification Authorities:
Two Changes
As mentioned, the original ETO provided for "recognition" of
CAs. 5° It established a program of recognition for CAs that show
themselves to be especially trustworthy entities. A CA applying
for "recognized" status must submit a report prepared by an
approved independent assessor attesting to the applicant's
147 ITBB, supra note 2.
148 Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, § 4 (supplementing § 5A of the
ETO).
149 Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, § 10 (amending ETO, § 15).
15o ETO, supra note 20, § § 20, 21.
[VOL. 7: 1
Hong Kong Electronic Signature Law
adherence to requirements of the ETO and the Code of Practice.' 5'
After attainment of recognition, the RCA must continue to submit
an assessment report every twelve months and each time it applies
for renewal of recognition.5 2
1. Bifurcation of the Assessment Report
The ETO was amended to allow the RCA to submit a sworn
statement in regard to its operational aspects (e.g., adherence to
non-discrimination against handicapped persons).'53  The
independent assessor is no longer required to address the
operational issues; the independent assessor will only address the
issues pertaining to trustworthiness of the RCA.'54
2. Major Changes in Mid-Year
The original ETO did not consider the impact of major changes
upon the RCA occurring in mid-year, between the times that the
assessment reports are submitted. In 2004, this omission was
addressed; the ETO was amended requiring the RCA to inform the
Director at once of the occurrence of major changes in its
organization which could have a bearing upon its suitability for
recognition.'55
VI. THE CODE OF PRACTICE FOR RECOGNIZED
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES
Section 33 of the ETO provides that "[t]he Director may issue
a code of practice specifying standards and procedures for carrying
out the functions of recognized certification authorities."'56
151 ETO, supra note 20, § 43.
152 ETO, supra note 20, § 43.
153 Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, §§ 12, 16, 21 (amending ETO
§§ 20, 27, 43).
154 Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, §§ 12, 16, 21 (amending ETO
§§ 20, 27, 43).
155 Amendment Ordinance, supra note 139, § 22 (supplementing § 43A of the
ETO).
156 This fact is re-affirmed at COP § 1.1, see infra note 157.
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Pursuant to that authority, the Director issued the Code of Practice
("COP") in July 2004.157 A slightly amended version was issued in
December 2004.158 This document grants insight into the plethora
of detailed daily duties that must be carried out by the RCA.'59
The Government Chief Information Officer ("GCIO") has
directed the Certification Authority Recognition Office ("CARO")
to "process applications for and renewal of CA recognition," and
to monitor whether existing RCAs are in compliance with the ETO
and the Code of Practice. 60
CARO shall consider an applicant-CA's ability to abide by the
COP in making its decision as to whether the CA qualifies for
recognition. 6' Specific criteria to be considered in the evaluation
of a CA's application for recognition include: financial status;
arrangements to cover potential liabilities; the proposed system for
issuance of certificates; the assessment report made by an external
auditor and the applicant's statutory declaration; and whether the
applicant and its officers are fit and proper persons.'62 CARO may
also take into account a failure to comply with the Code of Practice
157 Code of Practice for Recognized Certification Authorities Published by the
Government Chief Information Officer under Section 33 of the Electronic
Transactions Ordinance ("COP") (July 2004) (Cap. 553), (H.K.), available at
http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/caro/cop_pdf/cop.pdf.
158 Code of Practice for Recognized Certification Authorities Published by the
Government Chief Information Officer under Section 33 of the Electronic
Transactions Ordinance ("COP Amended") (Dec. 2004) (Cap. 553), (H.K.). The
amendments consisted only of the following: a revision of § 1.9 in order to
update the version numbers; and a revision of § 12.4(a) pertaining to the
Professional Accountants (Amendment) Ordinance 2004. Id. See also Office of
the GCIO, Information Note on the Advisory Committee on Code of Practice for
Recognized Certification Authorities, (July 2004) (reserving the right of the
GCIO to amend the Code of Practice). It also established a committee
(consisting of representatives of RCA's, business organizations, related
professional organizations, academics, and others) to provide advice as to
needed amendments to the Code of Practice. Id.
159 Undoubtedly, it will prove to be invaluable to future researchers
conducting empirical research pertaining to the activities of the RCA.
160 APEC, supra note 16, at 7.
161 COP, supra note 157, § 1.3.
162 ETO, supra note 20, § 21(4); Office of the GCIO, Guidance Note on
Recognition of Certification Authorities and Certificates Under the Electronic
Transactions Ordinance (Cap. 553), (July 2004) at 1.
[VOL. 7: 1
Hong Kong Electronic Signature Law
in a decision whether to suspend, revoke, or not renew a
recognition previously granted to a CA.'6 3 Other potentially
disqualifying factors include the CA's failure to abide by: (a) the
ETO; or (b) its own Certification Practice Statement ("CPS"). 164
A CA that has been refused recogntion (either when applying
the first time, or when applying for renewal of recognition), or
whose recognition has been suspended or revoked, may appeal the
Director's decision to the Secretary of the GCIO.165
If the COP conflicts with the ETO, the ETO will prevail.1 66 If
the English version conflicts with the Chinese version, the English
version will prevail.'67
A. Important Definitions
A certificate is required to contain the following: (1)
confirmation of the identity of the person holding a private key; (2)
the identity of the CA; (3) identification of the person to whom the
private key is issued; (4) the public key of the person to whom the
private key is issued; and (5) the CA's signature. 168
A common theme running through the COP pertains to
trustworthiness of the parties involved with digital signatures,
especially that of the CA. The COP requires the persons intimately
involved in the digital signature process to be "fit and proper
persons." '169 In determination of whether a person is "fit and
proper," the GCIO must consider the following factors (others may
also be considered): (1) the fact that a person has been convicted
in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region of a crime
consisting of fraud, corruption, or dishonesty; (2) the fact that an
individual person has been convicted of a violation of the ETO; (3)
163 COP, supra note 157, § 1.5
164 ETO, supra note 20, § 25.
165 ETO, supra note 20, § 28; Office of GCIO, supra note 162.
166 Code of Practice for Recognized Certification Authorities Published by the
Government Chief Information Officer under Section 33 of the Electronic
Transactions Ordinance ("COP") (July 2004) (Cap. 553), § 1.6 (H.K.), available
at http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/caro/cop_pdf/cop.pdf.
167 See id. § 1.8.
'
6 8 See id. § 2.1.
169 See id. § 5.18.
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the fact that the person is an undischarged bankrupt or has entered
into a voluntary or involuntary "scheme of arrangement" pursuant
to the Bankruptcy Ordinance within the past five years; and (4) the
fact that a corporation is in liquidation, the subject of a winding-up
order or has a receiver in charge of its finances pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Ordinance within the past five years.'70
A "recognized" certificate is one that is: (1) recognized
pursuant to ETO, Section 22; (2) a certificate of a type, class, or
description of one recognized pursuant to ETO, Section 22, or (3)
designated as "recognized" by the Postmaster General. 7'
Because CAs must maintain a repository of the certificates they
have issued, a definition was necessary. A repository is "an
information system for storing and retrieving certificates and other
information relevant to certificates.' 72
The COP defines a "subscriber" as one who is named in the
certificate as the one to whom the certificate is issued. 173 To
qualify as a subscriber, the person must have accepted the
certificate and must be holding a private key corresponding to a
public key listed in the certificate.'74 The COP provides that a
subscriber may also be a CA, i.e., it is acceptable for one CA to
issue a certificate to another CA. 175
The concept of "trustworthiness" not only applies to persons
involved with digital signatures-it also applies to the equipment
that is involved. 76 A "trustworthy system" consists of hardware,
software and procedures which are reasonably: (1) secure; (2)
available and reliable, and ensure a proper mode of operations for a
reasonable period of time; (3) suitable for performing their
intended function; and (4) in compliance with generally accepted
security principles. 17
'
70 See id. § 2.1.
171 Id.
172 id.
173 id.
174 id.
175 id.
176 id.
1771id
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In order to "verify" a digital signature, one must ensure that:
(1) the digital signature was created using the private key
corresponding to the public key listed in a certificate; and (2) the
digital record was not modified since the creation of the digital
signature.'78
B. General Responsibilities of a - Recognized Certification
Authority
The RCA must comply with all conditions which are
established by the GCIO at the time of granting or renewal of the
recognition. 179
Any agents or subcontractors employed by the RCA must be
equally capable of performing the duties, and the RCA is
responsible for the acts or omissions of the agents or
subcontractors. 8 °
An RCA has a duty to exercise reasonable care in its acts
which affect the subscribers and others relying upon the
certificates.8
The RCA must provide to the GCIO a copy of its certification
authority certificate that it uses to sign recognized certificates.'82
This will be published by the GCIO for use by interested parties in
verification of the validity of the recognized certificates.'83
Information having a retention requirement must be archived
for not less than seven years.'84
The ETO is concerned with secrecy, i.e., maintaining privacy
of personal data.'85 Toward that end, the COP requires the RCA to:
(1) publish to applicants and subscribers its privacy policy
pertaining to its handling of private, personal information; (2) give
a copy of its written Personal Information Collection Statement to
178 id.
179 See id. § 3.1.
180 See id. § 3.2.
181 See id. § 3.3.
182 See id. § 3.4.
183 id.
184 See id. § 3.5.
185 ETO, supra note 20, § 46.
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subjects before collecting private data from them; (3) include a
purpose statement in its repository or CPS defining the objective in
maintaining the repository and the permitted use of personal data
contained there; and (4) on a "regular" basis, or whenever major
changes have occurred, conduct a self-assessment pursuant to the
"Privacy Compliance Self-Assessment Kit" published by the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data." 6
RCAs are not allowed to engage in monopolistic activity; 18 7
antitrust behavior is undesirable because it results in restraint of
trade. Competition is desirable in the certification authority
industry in order to keep the cost of the service as low as possible
and to give the consumer a choice.
It is acceptable for an RCA to issue either a recognized
certificate, or a non-recognized one.' If both types are issued, the
RCA should express that fact in its repository and CPS.'89 In this
communiqud, the RCA should pinpoint the particular certificates,
or types/classes of certificates, that are recognized and which are
not. 190
C. Trustworthiness of the System
The RCA is mandated to use trustworthy hardware, software
and control procedures. 9' There are no absolute measures of
trustworthiness; it is a relative term.'92 The RCA must undertake a
risk analysis and adopt measures which will enable it to control the
risk it is facing 93 After the enactment of the ETO amendments in
2004,' Hong Kong has assumed a "technology-neutral" and
supposedly "minimalist" regulatory approach. 95 Accordingly, the
186 COP, supra note 157, at § 3.6.
187 See id. § 3.7.
188 See id. § 3.8.
189 id.
190 Id.
'9' See id. §§ 5.1, 5.2.
192 See id. § 5.4.
113 See id. § 5.6.
194 Electronic Transactions (Amendment) Ordinance, supra note 139.
195 COP, supra note 157, § 5.5. However, after being confronted with the
stringency and the meticulousness of the regulations in the Code of Practice,
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RCA has some latitude in determining the technical solutions it
may employ.'96 It is recognized that every private RCA is in a
unique situation and that methods used in attainment of a
trustworthy system may vary. Nevertheless, all RCAs should
strive to adhere to a group of fundamental maxims which serve as
a foundation for all-the Generally Accepted Industry Good
Practices. '97
If the RCA finds its system is no longer trustworthy, this
should be reported to the GCIO at once.'98
All responsible officers in trusted roles (i.e., security officers,
CA administrators, privileged system operators, registration
personnel, or anyone with access to key material cryptographic
modules, or activity event logs) are mandated to be "fit and proper
persons."' 99
D. Generally Accepted Industry Good Practices
The RCA should generally follow the "Generally Accepted
Industry Good Practices" with respect to:
1. Security Management Factors. Asset classification and
management (information should be treated as an asset, with
appropriate attention to data privacy),200 personnel security,2"'
physical and environmental security," 2 control of system access,2 3
security incident reporting procedure," planning for extraordinary
incidents (e.g., key compromise, security breach of the system or
network, unavailability of the RCA's infrastructure, unauthorized
RCAs must wonder what it would be like to be doing business in a "maximalist"
jurisdiction!
196 COP, supra note 186, at § 5.5.
197 See id § 5.9 et seq.
9
' See id, § 5.16.
'
9 9 See id. § 5.18.
200 See id. § 5.9.1(a).
20 See id § 5.9.1(b).
202 See id § 5.9.1(c).
203 See id. § 5.9.1(d).
204 See id. § 5.20.
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generation of certificates/certificate suspension and revocation
information);. 5
2. Operational Management Factors. Development of
effective policies and procedures over everyday operations,
delineation of duties of personnel, monitoring system performance
to control bottlenecks, protection of computer infrastructure (e.g.,
against viruses), provision of backup and archiving, and resolution
of problems;2 6
3. Computer Systems Management Factors. Establishment of
standards for development work, segregation of production and
development environments, segregation of duties of operative and
development personnel, handling emergency changes to systems,
and overseeing acquisition of new equipment;0 7
4. Business Operations Continuity Factors. Making and
testing contingency plans in order to cope with anticipated new
situations, and recovering from a compromise or suspected
compromise of the RCA's private key;0 8
5. Factors in Maintenance of Journals. Keeping journal
records of issuance and management of certificates,2 9 regularly
reviewing journals and noting missing entries and following-up,210
keeping logs pertaining to keys and security incidents;"' and
6. Compliance Monitoring Factors. Establishing controls to
ensure compliance with all legal, technical and regulatory
requirements."'
E. Good Practices Specific to Functions of an RCA
The RCA should be cognizant of, and adhere to, the "Good
Practices Specific to Functions of a Recognized CA." '213 These are
concerned with:
205 See id. § 5.2 1.
206 See id. § 5.9.2.
207 See id. § 5.9.3.
208 See id. §§ 5.9.4, 5.9.5, 5.9.6.
209 See id. § 5.9.7.
210 See id. § 5.9.8.
211 See id. § 5.9.9.
212 See id. § 5.9.10.
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1. Management of the CPS. A committee should be established
within the CA organization to prepare the Certification Practice
Statement ("CPS");214
2. Monitoring of the RCA 's Functions. The functions are
affected by laws and regulations to ensure that all legal and
regulatory requirements are understood and are being complied
with;21
5
3. Key Management. To ensure control of cryptographic
equipment used to generate keys (its procurement, receipt,
installation, acceptance tests, commissioning, usage, repair and
maintenance, retirement, and destruction), the personnel involved,
the keys' custody (e.g., using "dual access" control) and backup.216
4. Key Management Services Provided by the RCA (if
applicable). If the RCA assists the subscriber in controlling its
keys, these services must be monitored and controlled;217
5. Lifecycle Management of Tokens (if applicable). For
example, if smart cards are used by the RCA, control must be
established over their "preparation, activation, usage, distribution,
and termination; 218
6. Certificate Management. Verification of the applicant's
identity, notifying the subscriber in a timely manner before the
expiration date of the certificate that it is time to renew, adoption
of a common format of certificates, ensuring that the CA's
repository meets the standards expressed in the CA's CPS, and
establishment of a complaint-handling procedure;219 and
7. Management of the Publication of Certificate Revocation
Information. Ensuring that the relevant CPS policies and
procedures regarding revocation are followed, and ensuring that
213 See id. § 5.10.
214 See id. § 5.10.1.
215 See id. § 5.10.2.
216 See id. §§ 5.10.3, 5.10.4.
217 See id. § 5.10.5.
218 See id. § 5.10.6.
219 See id. § 5.10.7.
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only authorized persons have access to the certificate revocation
list.22
F. Key Management: Trustworthy Generation and Good Record-
Keeping
Key generation is the "heart and soul" of the RCA's job. If the
applicant generates his/her own keys, the RCA should emphasize
to the applicant the importance of using a trustworthy system to do
so.2 The RCA should provide trustworthiness guidelines to the
applicant and take "reasonably practicable steps" to determine
whether the applicant has in fact used a trustworthy system to
generate the keys.2 If the RCA determines that the applicant has
not used a trustworthy system or has not obeyed the prescribed
guidelines, the RCA should not accept the applicant's keys.223
The RCA must maintain good security over its own private
key.2 24
Good record-keeping is essential to effective management of
keys. Records must be kept of the following activities: (1)
issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation of certificates; (2) the
publication of information pertaining to revoked certificates (e.g.,
the certificate revocation list); (3) the creation of the RCA's own
key pair; (4) the creation of the subscribers' key pairs; (5) its
computer facilities;225 and (6) all issued certificates should be
archived and access to them should be permitted by relying
parties.226
G. Digital Signatures
Digital signatures should only be created by the party to whom
they relate. 27
2 20 See id. § 5.10.8.221 See id. § 5.11.
222 id.
223 id.
224 See id. § 5.12.
225 See id. § 5.13.
226 See id. § 5.14.
227 See id. § 5.15(a).
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It should be impossible for a digital signature to be reproduced
without the assistance or the knowledge of the person to whom the
digital signature relates.2
H. Issuance ofRecognized Certificates
An RCA may issue both recognized and non-recognized
certificates.229 If it issues both, separate private keys should be
used for the two categories.230
The recognized certificate should indicate to the subscriber, or
the relying third party, how to access the RCA's CPS.23'
The recognized certificate should only be issued: (1) to
applicants for such a certificate; and (2) after compliance with the
identity verification procedures listed in the RCA's CPS.2 2 The
identity verification procedure must be specified in the recognized
certificate, and the verification evidence must be retained by the
RCA.233
The RCA will publish certificates that have been issued and
accepted in its online repository.234 Subscribers must give personal
consent to the publication of their personal information. If both
recognized and non-recognized certificates have been issued by the
RCA, separate repositories shall be used.236 The repository must
contain:
(1) recognized certificates issued by that RCA (containing the public
key corresponding to the private key used by the RCA to digitally sign
recognized certificates it issues); 237 (2) suspension or revocation notices
(to include the certificate revocation list);238 (3) the disclosure record
for that RCA; 239 (4) other facts which materially and adversely affect
228 See id. § 5.15(b).229 See id. § 6.1.230 id.
231 See id. § 6.2.232 See id. § 6.3.
233 See id. §§ 7.1, 7.2.
234 See id. § 6.5.
235 See id. § 6.6.
236 See id. § 6.5.
237 See id. § 10.1 (a).
238 See id. §§ 9.3, 10.1(b).
239 See id. § 9.3.
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the reliability of the certificate, or which materially and adversely affect
the ability of the RCA to perform its services;240 and (5) other
information as specified by the GCIO.241
Recognized certificates may be renewed upon expiration of
their validity at the request of the subscriber and at the discretion
of the RCA.242
If the recognized certificate has a reliance limit, it must be
specified in the CPS and the significance of said limit must be
explained in the CPS. 243
The RCA must obtain insurance in order to provide coverage
for any potential liabilities arising from issuance of recognized
certificates, and the RCA must provide evidence of such
insurance.244 The RCA's amount of insurance coverage must be
not less than: (1) ten times the reliance limit specified by the RCA
in its CPS; or (2) $200,000, whichever is greater.245 Additionally,
the minimum total insurance coverage for aggregated claims are
required to be ten times the amount of (1) or (2), whichever is
greater.2 46  The insurance coverage must be administered by an
independent third party.247 Furthermore, the insurer must be: (1)
authorized to engage in the insurance business pursuant to the
Insurance Companies Ordinance (Cap. 41), including Lloyd's; 248
and (2) governed by the laws of the Hong Kong SAR. 2 4 9
The holder of a recognized certificate must be kept informed
by the RCA of any emerging fact which affects the validity of the
certificate.
The recognized certificate must state its expiration date.5
240 See id. § 10.1 (c).
241 See id. § 9.3.
242 See id. § 6.22.
243 See id. § 8.1
244 See id. § 8.2
245 id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 See id. § 8.3(a).
249 See id. § 8.3(b).
250 See id. § 6.7.
251 See id. § 6.8.
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The CPS of the RCA is only applicable to recognized
certificates; it is not applicable to non-recognized certificates. 25 2
I. Suspension and Revocation of Recognized Certificates
Suspension or revocation must be implemented if the RCA
obtains such a request from either: (1) the subscriber named on the
face of the certificate; or (2) a "properly authorized person. 253
If a certificate is suspended or revoked, notice must be placed
in the repository that is identified on the face of the certificate. 4
This must be accomplished "within a reasonable time. '"255
The RCA and the subscriber must reach an agreement as to the
exact time of the suspension or revocation, and the allocation of
liability for transactions relying upon the certificate between the
receipt of the request for revocation or suspension and the exact
time of the revocation or suspension. 6
The RCA may temporarily suspend a recognized certificate if it
has reasonable grounds to believe that it is unreliable; in this
situation, the consent of the subscriber is unnecessary. 7 Within a
reasonable time, the RCA must complete its investigation and with
either reinstate, or revoke, the certificate. 258
If the RCA decides that an immediate revocation is required,
the RCA may do so, and the consent of the subscriber is
unnecessary."'
The RCA shall provide an emergency method of
communication (i.e., a "hotline") for the subscriber to inform the
RCA that the private key has been lost or that its security has been
compromised.26 °
252 See id. § 6.9.
253 See id. § 6.13.
254 See id. §§ 6.12, 6.14.
255 See id. § 6.14.
256 See id. § 6.15.25 7 See id. § 6.16.
258 Id.
259 See id. § 6.17.260 See id. § 6.20.
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The RCA is required to maintain in its repository an archive of
suspended and revoked certificates.26" ' It must be maintained for a
minimum period of seven years.262
J. Disclosure of Information
Every six months, the RCA must report to the GCIA the
following information: (1) the number of subscribers in the
various categories of certificates; (2) the number of certificates that
have been issued, revoked, expired, and renewed by various
categories; (3) a comparison of its actual performance level with its
stated service levels; (4) new categories of certificates that have
recently been issued; (5) changes in its organization structure or
systems; and (6) actions taken to address deficiencies previously
noted in its most-recently submitted Assessment Report submitted
to the GCIO pursuant to ETO sections 20(3)(b), 27(5A)(b) or
43(1)(a) or 43A(1)(c).263
Any material changes in the above information must be
immediately reported.2 " The GCIO must be advised of personnel
changes pertaining to "responsible officers" within three days.265
Conflicts of interest, or potential conflicts of interest, must be
reported immediately. 66  Any "incident that materially and
adversely affects" the RCA's operations must be reported
immediately.267
Whenever the RCA submits a report or information to the
GCIO, it must possess the necessary legal rights over that report or
information, and must simultaneously grant a license to the RCA
to publish said report or information. 268 The RCA must agree to
the publication of any or all of the report or information,269 and it
261 See id. § 9.3.
262 See id. § 9.5.
263 See id. § 10.3.
264 See id. § 10.4.
265 See id. § 10.2.
266 See id. § 10.5.
267 See id. § 10.6.
268 See id. § 10.7.
269 See id. § 10.8.
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must not attempt to prevent the publication of the report or
information. °
K. Termination of the RCA's Service
Whenever the RCA applies for recognition or renewal of its
recognition, it should also submit a termination plan.' The
termination plan shall contain arrangements for maintenance of the
RCA's records for a period of not less than seven years after the
date of termination of its services.272 The termination plan must
cover both voluntary and non-voluntary situations, and must
provide for the safeguarding of the subscribers' interests upon the
RCA's termination.273  The CPS must include the termination
plan.274
In order for the RCA's termination to be recognized under the
ETO, the RCA must: (1) give a minimum of ninety days' notice to
the GCIO of its intention to terminate its services; (2) inform all
subscribers a minimum of sixty days before the termination date;
(3) advertise in both Chinese-language and English-language daily
Hong Kong newspapers for three consecutive days at least sixty
days before the termination; (4) revoke all certificates upon
termination of service; and (5) make an orderly transfer of
information contained in the RCA's repository to a custodian who
will maintain the information for a minimum of seven years from
the date of termination or from the date of transfer of the
information, whichever is later. The public should be informed of
how to access the information maintained by the custodian. 75
270 See id. § 10.9.
271Seeid. § 11.1.272 See id. § 11.2.273 See id. § 11.3.274 See id. § 11.4.275 See id. § 11.5.
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L. Annual Report of Compliance Assessment276
1. Independent Assessor's Compliance Review
Every twelve months after the RCA has attained its status,2 7  or
whenever the RCA applies for renewal of its status,2 or whenever
the RCA has undergone "major changes:" '279 an independent
assessor28 . must be hired by the RCA to submit a report to the
GCIO as to whether the RCA is in compliance with the ETO and
with the Code of Practice." The report must be submitted within
four weeks of the completion of the assessment.2" 2
2. RCA's Statutory Declaration of Compliance
Every twelve months after the RCA has attained its status,28 3 or
whenever the RCA applies for renewal of its status,8 " or whenever
the RCA has undergone "major changes,""2 5 the RCA shall submit
a statutory declaration to the GCIO as to whether the RCA is in
compliance with the ETO and with the Code of Practice. 26 The
statutory declaration must be submitted to the GCIO within four
weeks after it was prepared.287
276 See generally Office of GCIO, supra note 162.
277 COP, supra note 157 at § 12.1(a).
278 See id § 12.1(b).
279 See id. § 12.1(c).
280 The independent assessor's required qualifications are explained in COP,
supra note 157, §§ 12.212.5.
281 COP, supra note 157 at § 12.1. Specific parts of the ETO and the COP to
be addressed in the review are given in the COP, Appendix 2, § 1; they are
generally concerned with the trustworthiness of the RCA and its system.
282 COP, supra note 157 at § 12.6.28 3 See id § 13.1 (a).284 See id.§ 13.1(b).285 See id. § 13.1 (c).
286 See id. § 13.1. Specific parts of the ETO and the Code of Practice to be
addressed in the declaration are given in the COP, Appendix 2, § 2. They are
generally concerned with the operational aspects of the RCA, e.g., compliance
with anti-discrimination law. Trustworthiness issues are addressed in the
independent assessor's review, as noted above.
287 COP, supra note 157 at § 12.1(a).§ 13.3.
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M. Continual Upgrading of Technology, Inter-Operability, and
Consumer Protection
RCAs are mandated to continuously upgrade their technology
in order to provide good service to subscribers and relying third
parties.88 Specific policies, procedures and controls regarding
upgrading must be established.289  They must be assigned to
organizational units, and from time to time they must be re-
assessed.29°
RCAs shall do whatever possible to develop systems which are
interoperabl. 291 In other words, the RCA's systems should be able
to interact with systems of other RCAs, "wherever applicable. 292
Such development of an "open and common interface" will enable
the RCA's digital signatures and its certificates to be more easily
verified by other RCAs. 29" The RCA's CPS must express the
common interfaces that it supports and the degree of inter-
operability it has established with other RCAs.294
The RCA's advertisements must be "decent, honest and
truthful. '29' Advertising claims must be "fair and not misleading,"
and must be "capable of independent substantiation. '"296
N. The Certification Practice Statement ("CPS"): Overview
The main body of the COP provides an overview of the CPS.
Coverage of detailed standards and procedures in the construction
of the CPS is contained in Appendix 1 of the COP, 297 and are
presented in the next section.
2 8 8 See id. § 14.1.
2
19 See id. § 14.1(a).
290 See id. §§ 14.1(a), (b).
291 See id. §§ 15.1, 15.2.
292 See id. § 15.1.
293 Id.
294 See id. § 15.2.29 5 See id. § 16.1.
296 Id.
29 7See id. § 4.11.
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The CPS is only applicable to recognized CAs; it is not
applicable to non-recognized CAs.298
There are two types of CPS: ordinary and extraordinary.
1. Ordinary CPS
The CPS will be drafted by the RCA. It will be continually
reviewed and revised as necessary. An up-to-date copy will be
kept on file in the Office of the GCIO; it will also be posted in the
RCA's online repository for dissemination to subscribers and
relying parties.299 The primary information contained in the CPS
will be: (1) liabilities and limitations of liability (including
reliance limit);3"' (2) rights and obligations of the RCA, the
subscriber, and third parties relying on the certificate;"' (3)
whether the certificates it has issued are recognized or non-
recognized, and the types/classes of each category, and the
significance of having a non-recognized certificate;3 2 and (4)
notice to the applicants for recognized certificates that personal
data will become public information after it has been deposited in
the RCA's repository.3 3
2. Extraordinary CPS: After Material Changes
Pursuant to a 2004 amendment of the ETO,304 an interim,
supplementary CPS may need to be issued to the GCIO (and to
subscribers and relying parties) in the middle of a reporting period
if material changes occur.30 5  Examples of material changes
include: (1) the RCA's issuance of new types/classes of
recognized certificates; (2) changes in the identification process
29 8 See id. § 1.
299 See id. § 4.6.
300 See id. § 4.2.
301 Id.
302 See id. §§ 4.3, 4.4.
303 See id. § 4.5.
304 ETO, (2000) Cap. 553, § 24(43A). (H.K.), available at http://upanl.un.org
/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN01023 8.pdf.
305 COP, supra note 157 at § 4.12.
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that downgrade the reliability of the recognized certificates; and
(3) changes in the key generation, storage or usage procedures. 3°6
3. Standards and Procedures Regarding the Contents of a CPS
The Code of Practice, Appendix 1,307 specifies the minimum
standards and procedures expected of an RCA in preparing its
CPS.
30 8
A common theme applicable to all aspects of the work of the
RCA is that, insofar as possible, "widely accepted technical
standards and management practices" should be adopted. 3 9 These
standards and practices are to be specified in the CPS, along with
details of each, as well as "interface" applications for use of its
certificates and services.31 For example, the standards adopted for
the certificate profile, certificate revocation list, and repository
shall be published."' Adoption and publication of internationally-
accepted standards and practices will facilitate the RCA's
interaction with other related persons and organizations in all parts
of the world. By its very nature, e-commerce is a global
phenomenon and the Hong Kong CPS standards and procedures
definitely reflect this viewpoint.
The RCA is mandated to disclose the principal attributes of
each type, class, or description of certificate that it issues, e.g.:
recognition status, reliance limit, and the form of identification
required to be submitted by the subscriber.31 The RCA should
describe what recognition means and its importance to all relevant
306 COP, supra note 157 at § 4.12.
307 Code of Practice for Recognized Certification Authorities Published by the
Government Chief Information Officer, under Section 33 of the Electronic
Transactions Ordinance, ("CPS") (2004) Capt. 553, app. 1. (H.K.),
http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/caro/coppdflcop.pdf.
308 The idea of a CPS emanates from the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Digital Signature Guidelines. See supra note 23. The ABA Guidelines define
the CPS as "a statement of the practices which a certification authority employs
in issuing the certificates." Id.. § 1.8.
309 CPS, supra note 307, app. 1 § 10; see also COP, supra note 157, §§ 15.12.
310 id.
311 CPS, supra note 307, app. 1 § 10.
312 COP, supra note 157 at § 2.1.
FALL 2005]
N.C.J. L. & TECH.
parties,313 and should provide the website address of its
repository.314 The relevant groups or functions it impacts upon
(e.g., registration, repository, and target end-users) should be
delineated; any outsourcing of functions should be explained.315
Limitations or restrictions placed on each class of certificate
should also be disclosed.316 Contact information should be given to
all interested parties.317 A detailed description of the types of
information to be included in a CPS follows.
0. Obligations of the Parties
1. The RCA's Obligations
These include, but are not limited to, the provision of notice to
the subscriber of issuance, suspension or revocation of a
certificate.318  Additionally, the RCA assumes repository
responsibilities, e.g., timely publication of certification information
pertaining to issuance, suspension or revocation; and ensuring that
all interested parties are capable of accessing the repository.
2. The Subscriber's Obligations
These include, but are not limited to: providing accurate
information to the RCA when applying for issuance of a
certificate; taking care of the private key and doing everything
reasonably possible not to lose it or jeopardize its security; abiding
by any restrictions placed by the RCA upon the use of the private
key; and promptly informing the RCA whenever the private key
has been lost or its security has been compromised.319
313Id. § 2.2.1.
314 Id. § 2.2.2.
315 Id. § 2.2.3.
316id
317Id. § 2.2.4.318Id. § 3.3.1.
319 Id. § 3.1.2.
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3. The Relying Party's Obligations
The relying party has the duty:
[t]o learn the purpose for which the certificate has been issued; to
verify the authenticity of the digital signature; to enquire at the RCA's
online repository periodically as to whether the certificate has been
suspended or revoked; and to keep informed as to any limitation of the
RCA's liabilities and warranties.
320
4. Liability
The effect of a reliance limit should be emphasized.22
Warranties, and limits on warranties, for each type, class, or
description of certificate should be disclosed.322 The types of
liability assumed (i.e., for direct, indirect, special, consequential,
incidental, and liquidated damages) for each type, class or
description of certificate should be given, as well as any limitation
on liability (or loss limitations, or other exclusions) for each of
them.323 Additionally, the RCA should explain the assignment of
liability for transactions supported by a certificate which occur in-
between these two points-in-time: (1) when the subscriber
requests suspension or revocation of the certificate and (2) the time
of actual suspension or revocation by the RCA.324
5. Financial Responsibility
The RCA should include relevant financial information, such
as: the existence of any fiduciary relationships among parties
related to the certificate; financial responsibility for administrative
expenses incurred; financial assurances provided to the subscriber
and relying third parties; and miscellaneous financial information,
including but not limited to, performance bonds and insurance
policies.325
320 Id. § 3.1.3.
321 Id. § 3.2.
322 Id. § 3.2.1.
323 Id. § 3.2.2.
3 24 ld. § 3.2.
325 Id. § 3.3.
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6. Interpretation and Enforcement
The governing law and the jurisdiction for the enforcement of
relevant claims shall be stated.326 If dispute resolution procedures
have been agreed to, those should also be stated.327
7. Fees
Costs and fees should be disclosed as they affect both the
subscriber and relying third parties.2 8 Acts serving as the basis for
fee assessment include the certificate's issuance, revocation,
suspension, retrieval, or verification of status.329
8. Repository
The means of publication of information pertaining to the
issued certificates must be included.33 ° Ordinarily, this will be the
online website; its address must be disclosed so that all interested
parties may access it. 3 The contents of the repository should be
listed, e.g.: all certificates which have been issued and their
current recognition status, and a copy of the CPS with all
amendments.332 Additionally, the frequency of publication of the
information contained in the repository shall be expressed.333
9. Compliance Assessments
Full details of compliance assessments are also part of the
CPS.334 This includes: their frequency of occurrence; their identity
and qualifications of the independent auditor (e.g., a Certified
Public Accountant); any connections or relationships between the
RCA and the auditor (in other words, is the auditor really
independent); the scope of the compliance assessment (i.e., the
326 Id. § 3.4.1.327 /d. § 3.4.2.328 Id. § 3.5.
329 id.
330Id. § 3.6.
331 id.
332 Id.
333 id.334 Id. § 3.7.
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specific types and categories of information that it focuses on); to
whom the compliance report is disseminated to; and the policy
concerning follow-up action to resolve any problem areas which
have been uncovered and highlighted in the compliance report.335
10. Confidentiality
ETO § 46 emphasizes the importance of secrecy of private
information; the RCA is precluded from infringement of the right
of privacy of all interested parties. Accordingly, the
"Confidentiality Policy" section336 is one of the most important
parts of the CPS. Specific issues to be addressed includes:
categories of information which must be treated confidentially,
with special attention paid to the outsourcing component of the
RCA's activities; categories of information that are not
confidential; the parties to be informed in the cases of suspension
or revocation of certificates; laws and internal policies in regard to
release of otherwise-confidential information to law-enforcement
authorities or a court of law; the policy on release of records or
information to the subscriber, a relying party, or others; and the
situations or conditions allowing the RCA to disclose information
or records with the owner's consent.3 37
11. Identification and Authentication
It is critical for the RCA to use good methods of identification
of the parties and authentication of relevant documents.
12. Initial Certification
The naming convention should be expressed, e.g., "X.500
Distinguished Names ("DN").'3 38 Details of all name forms must
be given, including prefixes.339 Policies used to avoid "name
collisions," (i.e., two or more persons having the same name)
3 35 
id.336Id. § 3.8.
337 id.
3381d. § 4.1.1.
339 id.
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should be included, and it should be stated as to whether each
name must be unique.34 ° Also, there should be a name claim
dispute resolution procedure.34" ' Consideration should be given as
to whether names on the certificate are meaningful.342 The method
to prove the possession of the private key should be listed.343
One of the most crucial parts of the CPS concerns the specific
means of identification of the subscriber.3" If specific application
procedures are adopted and applied in each and every case, this
will enable a prospective subscriber to understand exactly what
personal data is required to be submitted in the application; and, it
will give the relying third party some notion as to the degree of
reliability of the certificates which have been issued under the
CPS.
3 45
13. Other Situations
In regard to an application for revocation or suspension of a
certificate, it is important for the CPS to express: who may make
such a request and in what circumstances; the effect of
revocation/suspension; how long after revocation/suspension
occurs will the publication occur; the duties of the subscriber to
inform the RCA of events which may require
revocation/suspension; and protections given to the subscriber after
revocation/suspension is requested (to include the allocation of
liability between the RCA and the subscriber). 346
Stringent identification information also must be required in
situations of routine re-key, certificate renewal, and re-key after
revocation.347
340 id.
341 Id. § 4.1.5.34 2 Id. § 4.1.2.
34 3 Id. § 4.1.6.
344Id. § 4.1.7.
345 Id.
346 Id. §§ 4.4, 4.5.
347 Id. §§ 4.2, 4.3.
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P. Operational Requirements
1. Steps in Application for a Certificate
The established procedure pertaining to application for a
certificate should be explained in detail. 48 The documentation
required, personal information to be authenticated, and the means
of identification must be expressed.349 Any interface requirement
must be explained.35 °
Additionally, the applicant should be explained the
responsibilities he/she will be assuming, terms and conditions
pertaining to the application, and any representations which may
have been made by the RCA. 5' The recognition status of the
certificates must be emphasized in the CPS; if the certificates are
not recognized, the implications of that status should be
expressed.352
2. Certificate Issuance
The CPS must include the processes employed by the RCA in:
the generation of keys;353 the delivery of keys;354 ensuring that it
does not have possession of the subscriber's private keys without
their written consent; creation of certificates; delivery of
certificates to applicants; and the posting of the certificates in the
repository.355
348 Id. § 5.1.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 id.
352 Id.
353 Id. § 5.2.
354 Id. If the keys are generated by the applicant, the public key must be
delivered to the RCA with the certificate request and the RCA must confirm that
the applicant is in possession of the corresponding private key. On the other
hand, if the keys are generated by the RCA, the private key must be safely
delivered to the applicant, and the RCA must indicate the precautions it takes to
ensure the security of keys in its possession.
355 Code of Practice for Recognized Certification Authorities Published by the
Government Chief Information Officer under Section 33 of the Electronic
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3. Certificate Acceptance
The CPS must describe the procedure used to assure that the
certificate has been accepted by the subscriber. 56 This includes the
necessity for the RCA to explain to the subscriber the significance
of their responsibilities."' The applicant will be given an
opportunity to verify the information on the certificate before
accepting.358 The applicant should be given a chance to either
accept the certificate, or reject it. 359 If deciding to accept, the
applicant will be issued the certificate.360
4. Certificate Suspension
The suspension process shall be expressed in detail, to include:
conditions for suspension; who can initiate/stop a suspension; how
a suspension is initiated/stopped; time limits for stopping the
suspension or moving from suspension to revocation; total time
allowed for the suspension to last; allocation of liability during the
"in-between period" (between request of suspension and
implementation of suspension); how much time is allotted the
RCA to check with the subscriber or a relying third party as to
whether the suspension should occur; and what the RCA should do
if the subscriber or the relying third party cannot be located.36'
5. Certificate Revocation
The revocation process shall be expressed in detail, to include:
conditions for revocation; who can initiate/stop a revocation; how
a revocation is initiated/stopped; methods used to give notice of a
revocation (e.g., posting, email, certificate revocation list, update
to a revocation/validity information server); the amount of time
allowed to complete the revocation process; and the allocation of
Transactions Ordinance, ("CPS") (2004) Cap. 553, §5.2. (H.K.), available at
http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/caro/cop_pdf/cop.pdf.
56Id. § 5.3.
357 Id. See also responsibilities defined in CPS. Id. § 3.1.2.358 Id. § 5.3.
359 Id.
360 Id.
161 Id. § 5.4. 1.
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liability in the "in-between period" (between time of request of
revocation and implementation of revocation).362
In order for the revocation request to be valid, the subscriber
(or authorized person) must: identify the certificate to be revoked;
give the reason for revocation; and attach a digital or a manual
signature.363 These requirements reduce the likelihood of an
imposter revoking the certificate of a subscriber.
Ordinarily, revocation is required in the following situations:
when information in the certificate has changed before its
expiration; the subscriber has not complied with the stipulations of
the CPS; the subscriber informs the RCA that the private key has
either been lost or its security may have been compromised; or the
subscriber no longer wants the ability to sign electronic
messages.3"
The RCA's Certificate Revocation Lists ("CRLs") identifies
the certificates that it has revoked, and the reasons for the
revocation.365 The CPS indicates its procedure for distribution of
the CRL and how relying parties may access it.366 Ordinarily, it is
posted at the RCA's website, but other means of publication may
also be used.367
The RCA must warn subscribers not to rely on a digital
signature if the certificate containing the public key has been
revoked.36 Additionally, the CPS must address the issue of
allocation of liability between the RCA and relying third parties in
the following situation: when the third party is temporarily unable
to obtain information pertaining to revoked certificates, and the
RCA is responsible for the third party's inability to obtain the
information.369
362 Id. § 5.4.2.
363 id.
364 id.
365 Id. § 5.4.3.
366 id.
367 id.
368 Id. § 5.4.4.
369 Id.
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6. Security Review Procedures
a. Utilization of Event Logs. In order to maintain a secure
environment, the RCA needs to list in the CPS the types of events
which must be "logged" in: any "suspicious network activity;"
(e.g., an unusual amount of unsuccessful attempts to gain access to
the network); events pertaining to the network installation,
modification and configuration of the network; and events
pertaining to privileged access to any part of the RCA's network.37 °
Also, the following events pertaining to management of
certificates need to be recorded: revocation and suspension
requests; actual issuance, revocation, and suspension; actual
renewals; additions made to the repository; creation and
publication of revocation and suspension information; the RCA's
generation of keys, and rollover operations; the RCA's generation
of key pairs for the subscriber; creation of backups and their
safekeeping; and recovery from emergencies. 71
The frequency of making entries in the event logs needs to be
noted,37 as well as the frequency of consolidation and review of
the logs.373 Specification needs to be made of the retention period
for the logs,374 the means of safeguarding the logs,375 and the
provision of backup procedures for the logs.376
b. Archived Records. A general maxim regarding records
retention is that the RCA should maintain records with sufficient
enough detail so as to allow the validation of a certificate and the
past "proper operation" of the certificate.377 Accordingly, the
following are typical data to be considered by the RCA for record-
keeping: data pertaining to initialization of the RCA's equipment
(e.g., configuration files, assessment reviews, CPS, and contracts
to which the RCA is a party), and data pertaining to the RCA's
370 Id. § 5.5.1.
371 Id.372 Id. § 5.5.2.
373 id.
374 Id. § 5.5.3.3751 d. § 5.5.4.
3761 d. § 5.5.5.
3 77 1d. § 5.6.
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operations (e.g., updates made to any of the aforementioned items,
all certificates and their suspension/revocation information,
periodic event logs, and other information as necessary).378
The retention period for archived information should be
expressed,379 as well as protection measures,"' and backup
procedures for said information.381
7. Key Changeover and Compromise
If the RCA routinely engages in changeover of the keys (e.g.,
as a security precaution), the changeover procedure should be
included in the CPS as well as details pertaining to how the
subscribers will be so informed.382
Because of the ever-present possibility of key compromise or
disaster, it is necessary for the RCA to have a response plan ready
in the event of those contingencies.383  In planning for the
compromise of the computer system, the following factors, at a
minimum, need to be considered in the CPS: how to re-establish a
secure environment after it has been tainted; how to make a
decision as to which certificates need to be revoked, if any; how to
decide if the RCA should revoke its own key; the procedure to be
employed in re-certification of the subscribers; and how the RCA's
new public key will be delivered to the subscribers.8
If a key compromise has taken place, or is strongly suspected,
subscribers and relying parties must be so informed. Additionally,
procedures pertaining to re-establishment of trustworthiness need
to be implemented.385
During or following a natural disaster, the facility's exceptional
security measures need to be implemented during the period before
normal security has been filly reinstated. For example,
378 id.
379Id. § 5.6.1.
380 1d. § 5.6.2.
381 Id. § 5.6.3.
382 Id. § 5.7.383 Id. § 5.8.3841d.385 id.
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exceptional security procedures would need to be implemented in
order to protect sensitive materials at a damaged location.386
8. The RCA's Termination Plan
Such a plan shall contain the steps to be taken in the winding-
up of the CA's service. Part of said plan will consist of notifying
the subscribers and the relying third parties. The future location of
the archived records, and the identity of their custodian, needs to
be conveyed. The arrangements for termination of service are
required to be in compliance with the requirements expressed in
section 1 1 of the Code of Practice.387
Q. Physical, Procedural and Personnel Security Controls
The RCA must also explain how the non-technical operational
controls help to ensure that its business is being conducted in a
trustworthy manner. These controls include physical, procedural
and personnel controls.388
1. Physical Security
Physical security controls should be described. The RCA must
have security over its buildings and offices. Secure areas must be
identified and control must be established over their access.
Environmental hazards (e.g., fire, humidity, water, etc.) must be
dealt with. Storage and disposal of media must be properly carried
out.
389
2. Procedural Controls Over the RCA 's Managers
Trusted roles need to be identified.39° The role in need of the
greatest degree of trust is the RCA's Administrator. This person
will supervise the issuance of certificates, organization of
386 id.
387 Id. § 5.9.
388 Id. § 6.
389 Id. § 6.1.
390 A trusted role is one "where the incumbent performs functions that can
introduce security problems if not carried out properly." Id. § 6.2.
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operations, and record-keeping."' The Administrator must be
especially cognizant of the organization's stipulations in its CPS,
and do everything possible to ensure that they are met.392
Another trusted role is that of Key Recovery Agent. This
person will supervise the "more specific functions related to the
maintenance of key recovery material or systems." '393
Other trusted roles may also be established by the RCA. In
order to promote trustworthiness and integrity of the system, a
good management control tool is to separate the duties of the
principal officers." This separation of powers and responsibilities
is good management because it results in a system of "checks and
balances" and helps to prevent any one of the officers from
violating the integrity and trustworthiness of the system, which is
so crucial to the success of the RCA's organization.
3. Control of Non-Managerial Personnel
In the RCA organization, use of good personnel management
methods is even more important than in the ordinary business firm,
and pay big dividends. In an RCA firm, relatively more attention
must be devoted to: (1) background checks and security clearances
when recruiting personnel; (2) employee training to ensure that all
understand the importance of maintaining a trustworthy system,
and how to perform their job functions efficiently and correctly;
(3) utilization of job rotation to reduce the likelihood that an
employee will be able to totally control one of the functions of the
RCA; (4) meticulous methods of performance appraisal, and
stringent discipline and punishment for infraction of work rules
pertaining to unauthorized acts; (5) heightened control over
contractor personnel and obtaining indemnification agreements
before they begin work in the RCA organization; and (6) provision
of manuals to the personnel explaining operational procedures and
the specific details of theirjobs.9
391 Id. § 6.2.
392 id.
393 id.
39
4 id.
3951Id. § 6.3.
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R. Technical Security Controls
1. Control of Keys
One of the most important factors pertaining to trustworthiness
concerns security of-the keys.396 Issues to be addressed in the CPS
include: who is responsible for generation of the key pair;
methods used to attain secure delivery of the keys to the
subscriber/certificate user; size of the key to be adopted; quality
controls over public key parameters; requirements concerning the
type and quality of cryptographic modules used; and the key's
usage and purpose (i.e., mapping under the X.509 PKI Certificate
Profile version 3 and CRL Profile version 2 standards).397
With respect to the issue of protection of the private keys, the
following issues are worthy of consideration in the CPS: technical
standards of the key generation module that is employed by the
RCA (e.g., the ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1 Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules); requiring more than one person to
approve a transaction pertaining to a private key; the type of back-
up established for private keys and security controls over it; the
security controls of the location at which the private keys are
archived; security controls over the keys' activation, usage,
deactivation and destruction; and the length of the usage period for
private keys.398
2. Control ofActivation Data
In addition to attainment of control over the keys themselves, it
is equally important to attain control over the activation data (e.g.,
passwords and PIN numbers) used for the keys; this applies
throughout the life cycle of such data, from their creation to their
distribution, utilization, archival, and eventual destruction.399
Issues in this regard which may be covered in the CPS include:
computer security controls (e.g., controls used to prevent
396 Id. § 7.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 Id.
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unauthorized access to the system-reference may be made to a
computer security rating framework standard, such as ISO
15408:199); system development life cycle controls (e.g.,
developing the hardware and software for the initial configuration
to prevent tampering); network security controls (e.g., use of a
firewall to protect the system from outside "invasion," or
monitoring of unauthorized access attempts; and cryptographic
module engineering controls (an appropriate standard may be
referenced, such as ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules).4"'
S. Certificate and CRL Profiles
The CPS shall include the format used for its certificates and
certificate revocation list ("CRL").4 °1 Although not specifically
mandated to be used, it is "generally envisaged" that the format of
the certificate will be ITU X.509 v3, and the format of the CRL
will be ITU X.509 v2 CRL.4 °2 Utilization of these standard
formats will facilitate the interaction of a particular RCA's
certificates4 3 and CRL's4 °4 with other organizations throughout the
world.
T. Procedures Pertaining to Posting and Amendment of the CPS
The CPS must specify the repository or other means used to
disseminate the CPS.405 The repository may be located at the
4 00 Id.
401 Id. § 8.
402 Id. These are standards developed by the International
Telecommunications Union.
403 More specific information pertaining to the certification format includes:
the version number supported; certificate extensions; cryptographic algorithm
object identifiers; name forms and constraints; certificate policy object
identifier; whether the policy constraints extension is employed; syntax and
semantics of policy qualifiers; and processing semantics of the critical certificate
policy extension. Id.
404 More specific information pertaining to the CRL includes: version
numbers supported; details regarding the entry extensions; and other media used
to publish notice of revocation and how to access them. Id.405 Id. § 9.2.
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RCA's website.4 6 The CPS must inform the subscribers and the
relying third parties the location of the repository and how to
access the CPS.407
The CPS should also include the procedure adopted for
amending the CPS.4"8 Means of notification of interested parties
(i.e., the subscriber, the relying third parties, and the GCIO) should
be stated.4"9 If the repository is used to notify the changes, the
posting to the repository should be made before, or very soon after,
the changes have been made.41 ° The CPS may also indicate the
types of changes, if any, that do not require prior notification to the
parties.411
VII. THE SECRETARY'S EXECUTIVE ORDER OF 2005
Section 11(2) of the ETO provides that: "The Secretary may,
in relation to an Ordinance to which this Ordinance applies,
specify by notice published in the Gazette (a) the manner and
format in which information in the form of an electronic record is
to be given, presented or retained for the purposes of that
Ordinance . . . ." Accordingly, in January of 2005, Secretary
Francis Ho issued an executive order specifying the required
format for the submission of documents in electronic form to the
Hong Kong government. 12 This executive order went into effect
on 1 March 2005.' 1  The order is applicable to electronic
documents filed with the government, but does not apply to
406 id.
407 Id.
408 Id. § 9.1.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 id.
412 Office of the Permanent Secretary for Commerce, Industry and
Technology (Communications and Technology), Government of the Hong Kong
SAR, General Format, Manner and Procedure for the Submission of Electronic
Information under Law by virtue of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance,
January 27, 2005 (effective Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.hongkongpost.com/
eng/eto.htm.413 id.
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electronic documents transmitted to private, non-governmental
parties. Private parties determine their own format requirements.414
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
Hong Kong is perhaps the "most wired" city in the world and
has one of the best environments for e-commerce. Hong Kong's
e-signature law is a major contributing factor to this environment.
The Electronic Transactions Ordinance ("ETO") was enacted
in 2000 and provided for legal recognition of the digital signature
in private e-commerce transactions and in official communications
with the Hong Kong government. A digital signature was given
the same legal effect as if were a handwritten one. This removal of
the legal impediments toward electronic "signing" facilitated the
development of e-commerce (and E-government) in Hong Kong.
With the adoption of the digital signature, Hong Kong
concomitantly began to utilize asymmetric cryptology, public key
infrastructure, and a system of regulation of certification
authorities.
However, the original ETO allowed only one form of
electronic signature--digital. This ran contrary to the trend in
global electronic signature law, which encourages nations to take a
"technologically neutral" approach and not to grant a "monopoly"
to only one form of electronic signature. Accordingly, the ETO
was amended in 2004 to allow for: (1) other forms of electronic
signatures to be acceptable in the private sector, with retention of
the digital signature requirement for communiqu6s with the
government; (2) electronic delivery whenever an ordinance
specifies that delivery is to be "by post or in person;" (3)
414 Id. For example: (1) if English characters are used, they must be coded in
either ASCII or ISO 10646-1:2000; (2) if English characters are coded in
ASCII, then Chinese characters shall be coded in Big 5; (3) if electronic records
are compressed, then one of the following compression standards shall be used:
Zip file (.zip), or GNU zip file (.gz); (4) one of the following file formats must
be used: TXT, RTF, HTML, or PDF; and (5) graphics must employ one of these
graphic file formats: EPSF, TIFF, PNG, GIF, or JPEG. Id.
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bifurcation of the Annual Report of Compliance Assessment
pertaining to certification authorities ("CA"), with one part to be
performed by an independent auditor, and the other part to be
achieved with submission of a sworn statement from the CA; and
(4) a requirement that certain types of major changes in the CA's
organization or status must be reported immediately to the
government, in the middle of the reporting period.
Hong Kong has a "voluntary" system of regulation of CA's; it
is not compulsory for CAs to apply for, or to achieve, recognized
status. However, the advantage in doing so is that the recognized
certification authority ("RCA") is able to provide more overall
security for the subscriber than a non-recognized one, and the
subscriber may be willing to pay more for the RCA's services as a
result. Pursuant to the ETO, the Government Chief Information
Officer ("GCIO") issued the Code of Practice, a handbook of
regulations pertaining to RCAs, in 2004. The Code of Practice
meticulously specifies the standards and procedures for carrying
out the functions of an RCA, and includes detailed requirements
pertaining to these two documents: (1) the RCA's Annual Report
of Compliance Assessment; and (2) the RCA's Certification
Practice Statement. These two documents, both of which must be
periodically submitted by the RCA to the GCIO, play an important
role in the attainment of governmental oversight over the activities
of RCAs. Therefore, whilst the amended ETO now recognizes the
validity of more than one form of electronic signature,
simultaneously it is strengthening the degree of trustworthiness of
digital signatures through more stringent regulation of RCAs.
However, one criticism of the government's promulgation of
so many minute regulations of RCAs is that this runs counter to a
basic trend in worldwide electronic signature law-minimalization
of regulatory control by the government. The "minimalists" argue
that digital signatures should be controlled more by market forces
than by governmental regulations. One of the counter-arguments
to this point of view, however, is that the digital signature is not
required in the private sector; it is only mandatory when
electronically communicating with the government of Hong Kong.
Thus, in a private sector transaction, the transacting party is not
confined to utilization of the digital signature, and is free to choose
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another form of electronic signature and avoid altogether the rather
stringent regulatory rules adopted for CAs. A party "opting out" of
the digital signature, though, may later regret that decision because
he/she will then ordinarily have a relatively less secure
environment than that afforded by the digital signature. Trade-
offs, always tradeoffs.., we can never avoid them.
B. Recommendations
So far, the ETO seems to be doing a good job in protecting the
consumer-subscriber from the unscrupulous or incompetent RCA.
The RCA faces a colossal amount of regulation, making it difficult
indeed for that party to engage in illegal, unethical, or incompetent
behavior. Besides the technical regulations, the RCA is also
mandated to employ fair advertising methods.
However, the greatest potential threat to the online consumer is
neither the RCA nor the computer hacker-it is the online seller!
The original ETO and its amendments do not provide enough
protection of the nave consumer-buyer from the unscrupulous
cyber-seller. To fill this vacuum, the ETO should be amended
again; a new section should be added pertaining to the online
seller's required disclosures to the buyer. The new section should
be modeled after the consumer disclosures section of the U.S.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
("E-Sign").415 The following provisions (paraphrased from the
E-Sign Act) need to be included:
1. If the seller is already required to give information to the consumer
in writing, provision of the information in electronic form is only
allowed if.
416
i. the buyer consents to the electronic form (and has not withdrawn
consent); 417 and
ii. prior to the consent, the consumer was informed in a "clear and
conspicuous statement;
' l18
415 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-Sign")
§§ 101-104, codified at 15 U.S.C. 7001-31 (2000).416/d. § 101(c)(1).
417 Id. § 101(c)(1)(A).
418 Id. § 101(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The "clear and conspicuous"
requirement means just what it says-this notice should be in plain view, not
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iii. that he/she is not mandated to accept the electronic form, he/she
may refuse to accept it, and he/she was informed of the right to
withdraw the consent (and any penalties incurred because of
withdrawal of consent); 419
iv. whether the consent applies only to the particular transaction
currently under consideration, or other transactions as well;
420
v. how to withdraw consent and how to electronically update contact
information of the buyer;
421
vi. how the buyer may obtain a paper copy of an electronic record, and
the amount of fee (if any) charged for the copy; 422 and the consumer421
before consenting, was given a statement of the required computer
hardware and software necessary to access the electronic records;
424
vii. consented electronically, "in a manner that reasonably
demonstrates" that the consumer possesses enough computer
knowledge and understanding to be able to "access information in the
electronic form that will be used to provide the information that is the
subject of the consent;' '425 and
viii. after consent has been given, if a change in the hardware or
software required to access electronic records leads to a "material risk"
that the consumer won't be able to obtain access in the future, or to
retain an electronic document in the future, then the seller must:
426
ix. provide the buyer a statement of the revised hardware and software
requirements, with notice that the buyer may now withdraw the consent
previously given without imposition of a fee or a penalty; 427 and
x. again comply with (c), above.428
2. These provisions do not affect or replace any other disclosures to the
consumer which may be required under another statute, regulation or
rule of law.429
hidden and accessible only by clicking on an inconspicuous link which can be
easily overlooked.
419 Id. § 101(c)(1)(B)(i).
420Id. § 101(c)(1)(B)(ii).
421 Id. § 101(c)(1)(B)(iii).
422 Id. § 101(c)(1)(B)(iv).
4231 d. § 10l(c)(1)(C).
424Id. § 101(c)(1)(C)(i).
425 Id. § 101(c)(1)(C)(ii).
4 26 1d. § 101(c)(1)(D).
427 Id. § 101(c)(1)(D)(i).
428 Id. § 101(c)(1)(D)(ii).
429 Id. § 101 (c)(2)(A).
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3. Withdrawal of consent in (1), above, does not affect the legal
validity of electronic records provided to the buyer before the consent
was withdrawn. The buyer's withdrawal of consent is effective "within
a reasonable period of time" after receipt of the withdrawal by the
seller. The buyer may elect to treat a failure of the seller to comply
with (1)(d), above, as a withdrawal of consent.43 °
C. A Final Thought
Law, by its very nature, is not "cast in stone." It is always a
work in process, a stage in the evolutionary process. Hong Kong's
Electronic Transactions Ordinance is no exception. The
amendments of 2004 significantly improved it and, in all
likelihood, more "fine tuning" of the ETO will occur in the future.
Expect Hong Kong to continue to be in the vanguard of world e-
commerce law and to uphold its reputation as one of the world's
"most wired" cities.
4 30 Id. § 101(c)(4).
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